The write protection of the __wr_after_init data can be verified with the
same methodology used for const data.
Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: linux-integrity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
CC: kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
CC: linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx
CC: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
mm/rodata_test.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/rodata_test.c b/mm/rodata_test.c
index 3c1e515ca9b1..a98d088ad9cc 100644
--- a/mm/rodata_test.c
+++ b/mm/rodata_test.c
@@ -16,7 +16,19 @@
#define INIT_TEST_VAL 0xC3
+/*
+ * Note: __ro_after_init data is, for every practical effect, equivalent to
+ * const data, since they are even write protected at the same time; there
+ * is no need for separate testing.
+ * __wr_after_init data, otoh, is altered also after the write protection
+ * takes place and it cannot be exploitable for altering more permanent
+ * data.
+ */
+
static const int rodata_test_data = INIT_TEST_VAL;
+static int wr_after_init_test_data __wr_after_init = INIT_TEST_VAL;
+extern long __start_wr_after_init;
+extern long __end_wr_after_init;
static bool test_data(char *data_type, const int *data,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
@@ -60,6 +72,9 @@ void rodata_test(void)
{
if (test_data("rodata", &rodata_test_data,
(unsigned long)&__start_rodata,
- (unsigned long)&__end_rodata))
+ (unsigned long)&__end_rodata) &&
+ test_data("wr after init data", &wr_after_init_test_data,
+ (unsigned long)&__start_wr_after_init,
+ (unsigned long)&__end_wr_after_init))
pr_info("all tests were successful\n");
}
--
2.19.1
