Commit ae1319eeabd6 ("Remove hardcoding of SHA1 in EVM signatures")
introduces overflow of 20 byte buffer on the stack while calculating evm
hash. Also, invalid hash length is passed to the underlying verification
function. This prevents any non-SHA1 hashes from being properly
validated using evmctl.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/evmctl.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
index 1b46d58..94d7ab1 100644
--- a/src/evmctl.c
+++ b/src/evmctl.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <termios.h>
+#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -760,13 +761,15 @@ static int cmd_sign_evm(struct command *cmd)
static int verify_evm(const char *file)
{
- unsigned char hash[20];
+ unsigned char hash[64];
unsigned char sig[1024];
+ int mdlen;
int len;
- len = calc_evm_hash(file, hash);
- if (len <= 1)
- return len;
+ mdlen = calc_evm_hash(file, hash);
+ assert(mdlen <= sizeof(hash));
+ if (mdlen <= 1)
+ return mdlen;
len = lgetxattr(file, "security.evm", sig, sizeof(sig));
if (len < 0) {
@@ -779,7 +782,7 @@ static int verify_evm(const char *file)
return -1;
}
- return verify_hash(file, hash, sizeof(hash), sig + 1, len - 1);
+ return verify_hash(file, hash, mdlen, sig + 1, len - 1);
}
static int cmd_verify_evm(struct command *cmd)
--
2.11.0
