On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 11:24 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for
> the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a
> hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it. Also get rid of
> the ima_used_chip variable and use the new ima_tpm_chip variable instead
> for determining whether to call TPM functions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Jarkko, would you mind staging this patch with the rest of the patch
set?
Mimi
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 16 +++++-----------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 4 ++--
> 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 354bb5716ce3..2ab1affffa36 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
> extern int ima_policy_flag;
>
> /* set during initialization */
> -extern int ima_used_chip;
> extern int ima_hash_algo;
> extern int ima_appraise;
> +extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
>
> /* IMA event related data */
> struct ima_event_data {
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> index 4e085a17124f..7e7e7e7c250a 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> @@ -631,10 +631,10 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
>
> static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
> {
> - if (!ima_used_chip)
> + if (!ima_tpm_chip)
> return;
>
> - if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0)
> + if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0)
> pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> index 29b72cd2502e..faac9ecaa0ae 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
>
> /* name for boot aggregate entry */
> static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
> -int ima_used_chip;
> +struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
>
> /* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
> * the PCR register.
> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
> iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
> iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
>
> - if (ima_used_chip) {
> + if (ima_tpm_chip) {
> result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
> if (result < 0) {
> audit_cause = "hashing_error";
> @@ -106,17 +106,11 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
>
> int __init ima_init(void)
> {
> - u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> int rc;
>
> - ima_used_chip = 0;
> - rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i);
> - if (rc == 0)
> - ima_used_chip = 1;
> -
> - if (!ima_used_chip)
> - pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n",
> - rc);
> + ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
> + if (!ima_tpm_chip)
> + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
>
> rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
> if (rc)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> index 418f35e38015..b186819bd5aa 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> @@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
> {
> int result = 0;
>
> - if (!ima_used_chip)
> + if (!ima_tpm_chip)
> return result;
>
> - result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash);
> + result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash);
> if (result != 0)
> pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
> return result;
