Re: [PATCH V6] EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs

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On Tue, 2018-05-15 at 10:38 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Sites may wish to provide additional metadata alongside files in order
> to make more fine-grained security decisions[1]. The security of this is
> enhanced if this metadata is protected, something that EVM makes
> possible. However, the kernel cannot know about the set of extended
> attributes that local admins may wish to protect, and hardcoding this
> policy in the kernel makes it difficult to change over time and less
> convenient for distributions to enable.
> 
> This patch adds a new /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs node,
> which can be read to obtain the current set of EVM-protected extended
> attributes or written to in order to add new entries. Extending this list
> will not change the validity of any existing signatures provided that the
> file in question does not have any of the additional extended attributes -
> missing xattrs are skipped when calculating the EVM hash.
> 
> [1] For instance, a package manager could install information about the
> package uploader in an additional extended attribute. Local LSM policy
> could then be associated with that extended attribute in order to
> restrict the privileges available to packages from less trusted
> uploaders.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> 
> Calling simple_setattr() directly here - this should be safe, since
> there'd only be a different setattr() implementation if we'd passed one
> in in the first place.

Thanks, no error messages now.

Mimi




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