On Thu, 2018-05-10 at 23:26 +0000, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote: > On Wed, May 09, 2018 at 10:00:58PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Wed, 2018-05-09 at 23:48 +0000, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote: > > > On Wed, May 09, 2018 at 06:06:57PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > > > > > Yes, writing regdb as a micro/mini LSM sounds reasonable. The LSM > > > > > > would differentiate between other firmware and the regulatory.db based > > > > > > on the firmware's pathname. > > > > > > > > > > If that is the only way then it would be silly to do the mini LSM as all > > > > > calls would have to have the check. A special LSM hook for just the > > > > > regulatory db also doesn't make much sense. > > > > > > > > All calls to request_firmware() are already going through this LSM > > > > hook. I should have said, it would be based on both READING_FIRMWARE > > > > and the firmware's pathname. > > > > > > Yes, but it would still be a strcmp() computation added for all > > > READING_FIRMWARE. In that sense, the current arrangement is only open coding the > > > signature verification for the regulatory.db file. One way to avoid this would > > > be to add an LSM specific to the regulatory db > > > > Casey already commented on this suggestion. > > Sorry but I must have missed this, can you send me the email or URL where he did that? > I never got a copy of that email I think. My mistake. I've posted similar patches for kexec_load and for the firmware sysfs fallback, both call security_kernel_read_file(). Casey's comment was in regards to kexec_load[1], not for the sysfs fallback mode. Here's the link to the most recent version of the kexec_load patches.[2] [1] http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2018-May/006690.html [2] http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2018-May/006854.html Mimi
