Hi James,
This pull request contains a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and
continues to close IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps.
Closing measurement, appraisal, and audit gaps:
- A new LSM hook named security_cred_getsecid is defined in order to
validate a file's integrity based on the credentials of the process
going to being executed, not of the existing process.
- Fuse filesystems are inherently untrusted. Instead of always re-
evaluating files, this pull request differentiates between privileged
and unprivileged mounts, and defines a new builtin policy to fail file
signature verification even on privileged mounted filesystems.
Code cleanup:
- Support for verifying a file's integrity based on an appended
signature (scripts/sign-file) is coming along really nicely. This
pull request includes some of the cleanup patches from the appended
signature patch series.
thanks,
Mimi
---
The following changes since commit 5893ed18a26d1f56b97c0290b0cbbc2d49d6de28:
Merge tag 'v4.16-rc6' into next-general (2018-03-23 08:26:16 +1100)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
for you to fetch changes up to ab60368ab6a452466885ef4edf0cefd089465132:
ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm (2018-03-25 07:26:32 -0400)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hernán Gonzalez (2):
evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
Jiandi An (1):
ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface
Martin Townsend (1):
ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list
Matthew Garrett (2):
security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Mimi Zohar (5):
ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
ima: clear IMA_HASH
ima: fail signature verification based on policy
fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
Petr Vorel (1):
ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm
Sascha Hauer (1):
evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing
Thiago Jung Bauermann (3):
integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS
ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()
ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
Tycho Andersen (1):
ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++-
fs/fuse/inode.c | 3 ++
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 2 -
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 ++
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 12 +++--
security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 25 +++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++------
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 32 ++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 11 ++--
security/integrity/integrity.h | 11 ++--
security/security.c | 7 +++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 18 +++++++
22 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
