On 03/15/2018 03:20 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
On 03/15/2018 03:01 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
On Thu, 2018-03-15 at 14:51 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
On 03/15/2018 02:45 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
going to need some type of keyring namespace and there's
already
one hanging off the user_ns:
commit f36f8c75ae2e7d4da34f4c908cebdb4aa42c977e
Author: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Sep 24 10:35:19 2013 +0100
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent
per-UID
kerberos caches
The benefit for IMA would be that this would then tie the keys
needed for appraising to the IMA namespace's policy.
However, if you have an appraise policy in your IMA namespace,
which is now hooked to the user namespace, and you join that user
namespace but your files don't have signatures, nothing will
execute anymore. That's now a side effect of joining this user
namespace unless we have a magic exception. My feeling is,
people may not like that...
Agree, but I think the magic might be to populate the ima keyring
with the parent on user_ns creation. That way the user_ns owner
can delete the parent keys if they don't like them, but by default
the parent appraisal policy should just work.
That may add keys to your keyring but doesn't get you signatures on
your files.
But it doesn't need to. The only way we'd get a failure is if the file
is already being appraised and we lose access to the key. If the
Well, the configuration I talked about above was assuming that we have
an appraisal policy active in the IMA namespace, which is now tied to
the user namespace that was just joined.
If we are fine with the side effects of an IMA policy active as part
of a user namespace then let's go with it. The side effects in case of
an active IMA appraisal may then be that files cannot be
read/accessed, or file measurements or IMA auditing may occur.
The alternative is we have an independent IMA namespace. If one joins
the USER namespace and there are no IMA-related side effects. If one
joins the IMA namespace its IMA policy should start being enforced. If
the current active USER namespace has the keys that go with the
signatures of the filesystem, then we're fine from the appraisal
perspective. If not, then IMA namespace joining may prevent file
accesses.
parent policy isn't appraisal, entering the IMA NS won't cause
Why parent policy? The policy of the namespace that was joined should
be the active one, no ?
Unless I am completely blind we should never stop enforcing the parent's
polciy. We should only add policy to enforce for the scope of a
container.
What we want is an independent policy for each IMA namespace.
What we don't want is that root can abuse his power to spawn new
namespaces and circumvent a file appraisal policy on the host (in
init_ima_ns). Because of that root's activities are subject to the IMA
policy of the currently active IMA namespace and the one of init_ima_ns
(and possibly all the ones in between). If root is working in a child
IMA namespace and file appraisal fails due to the policy in init_ima_ns
and keys found in .ima or _ima keyrings attached to init_user_ns, the
file access will be denied.
Besides that root's activities will always be measured and audited
following the policy in init_ima_ns. This tries to prevent that root
spawns an IMA namespace with a NULL policy and does things in the TCB
and tries to escape the logging.
In practice this is just the containers policy as the container is most
likely a do whatever you want to in the parent policy. But not always
and not explicitly.
Mount namespaces are not hierarchical, user namespaces are. Which makes
them much more appropriate for being part of nested policy enforcement.
We don't want additive or hierarchical policies - at least I don't. They
should be independent. Only exception are activities of root that are
always iteratively evaluated against policies of the current IMA NS and
the init_ima_ns and possibly all the ones in between.
From previous conversations I remember that there is a legitimate
bootstrap problem for IMA. That needs to be looked at, and I am not
seeing that mentioned.
IMA's log should not have a gap. So ideally we shouldn't have to write
something into sysfs to spawn a new IMA namespace so that we don't miss
whatever setup may have happened to get there, including the writing
into procfs. IMA should be there right from the start. So a clone flag
would be ideal for that.
Eric
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