Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > On Wed, 2018-02-14 at 09:16 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > > > On Wed, 2018-02-14 at 08:49 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > > > > > Files on untrusted filesystems, such as fuse, can change at any time, > > > > > making the measurement(s) and by extension signature verification > > > > > meaningless. > > > > > > > > > > FUSE can be mounted by unprivileged users either today with fusermount > > > > > installed with setuid, or soon with the upcoming patches to allow FUSE > > > > > mounts in a non-init user namespace. > > > > > > > > > > This patch always fails the file signature verification on unprivileged > > > > > and untrusted filesystems. To also fail file signature verification on > > > > > > > > Why only untrusted? Fuse could cause the same issue if it just > > > > messes up when mounted from init userns right? > > > > > > Right, whether it is an unprivileged mount or not, fuse can return > > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. IMA can calculate the file hash > > > based based on what it reads, but fuse can return whatever it wants on > > > subsequent reads. > > > > Ok but your patch seems to let privileged fuse mounts slide? (see below) > > Unprivileged fuse mounts hasn't been upstreamed yet, so we wouldn't be > breaking existing userspace. I don't think I'm being clear. In your patch it looks like you mark unprivileged FUSE mounts as INTEGRITY_FAIL. I agree you should do that. But you skip the FS_UNTRUSTED check for privileged FUSE mounts. I'm asking why that's ok. > > > Refer to the discussion with Linus - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu > > > x-security-module-archive/2018-February/005200.html > > > > > > > > privileged, untrusted filesystems requires a custom policy. > > > > > > > > (I'm not saying you shouldn't do this, but) does this mean that > > > > a container whose rootfs is fuse-mounted by the unprivileged user > > > > cannot possibly use IMA? > > > > > > How would you suggest to differentiate between your unprivileged fuse > > > mounts from unintended, unintended malicious ones? > > > > I wouldn't. > > What happened to the requirement that systems should be "fail-safe"? My point was - I was asking whether there was any way to have IMA be meaningful with such containers, not saying I had any ideas, and certainly not saying that just because you can't detect it means you should allow it in all cases. It's too bad that it has this effect, but I agree with your patch. I only didn't ack it because you're skipping the check for privileged mounts which seems wrong. -serge
