On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 12:48 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi Matthew, > > On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 01:40 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the > > credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the > > child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target > > and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In > > ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and > > the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started. > > This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to > > include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same > > credentials that it did previously. > > < snip > > > > @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > > case LSM_SUBJ_USER: > > case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: > > case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: > > - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); > > + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid); > > rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, > > rule->lsm[i].type, > > Audit_equal, > > Based on the patch description, I wouldn't expect to see any changes > here, unless this is wrong to begin with. In which case, it should be > a separate patch. We need to check against the appropriate credentials structure, and since we're doing this before commit_creds() has been called we can't just do it against the one in the task structure. For BPRM_CHECK that'll be current_cred(), which means there's no change in functionality, whereas for CREDS_CHECK it'll be the new credentials structure.
