On Tue, Nov 07, 2017 at 11:37:07AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Commit b65a9cfc2c38 ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters")
> moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a
> point where the file descriptor is already opened.
>
> This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed
> belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The
> consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good
> values, regardless of the current appraisal status.
>
> For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after
> opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file
> will be allowed afterwards.
>
> Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating
> security.ima.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
IIUC this seems like a huge deal. Shouldn't this go in separately, asap?
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 285a53452fb5..1b2236e637ff 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -320,6 +320,9 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
> if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
> return;
>
> + if (iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
> + return;
> +
> rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
> if (rc < 0)
> return;
> --
> 2.11.0
