Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH] tpm: remove chip_num parameter from in-kernel API

Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> · Mon, 23 Oct 2017 10:07:31 -0400

On 10/23/2017 08:38 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
The reasoning is simple and obvious. Since every call site passes the
value TPM_ANY_NUM (0xFFFF) the parameter does not have right to exist.
Refined the documentation of the corresponding functions.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
  drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c    |  2 +-
  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c         | 38 ++++++++--------
  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c    | 87 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
  drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h              |  2 +-
  include/linux/tpm.h                 | 43 ++++++++----------
  security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c |  2 +-
  security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   |  2 +-
  security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c  |  2 +-
  security/keys/trusted.c             | 35 ++++++++-------
  9 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
index d6d448266f07..8823efcddab8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@

  static int tpm_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
  {
-	return tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, data, max);
+	return tpm_get_random(data, max);
  }

  static struct hwrng tpm_rng = {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index a114e8f7fb90..ec351111643b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -81,34 +81,32 @@ void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_put_ops);

  /**
- * tpm_chip_find_get() - return tpm_chip for a given chip number
- * @chip_num: id to find
+ * tpm_chip_find_get() - reserved the first available TPM chip
   *
- * The return'd chip has been tpm_try_get_ops'd and must be released via
- * tpm_put_ops
+ * Finds the first available TPM chip and reserves its class device and
+ * operations.
+ *
+ * Return: a reserved &struct tpm_chip instance
   */
-struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num)
+struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void)
  {
-	struct tpm_chip *chip, *res = NULL;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	struct tpm_chip *res = NULL;
  	int chip_prev;
+	int chip_num;

  	mutex_lock(&idr_lock);

-	if (chip_num == TPM_ANY_NUM) {
-		chip_num = 0;
-		do {
-			chip_prev = chip_num;
-			chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num);
-			if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) {
-				res = chip;
-				break;
-			}
-		} while (chip_prev != chip_num);
-	} else {
-		chip = idr_find(&dev_nums_idr, chip_num);
-		if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip))
+	chip_num = 0;
+
+	do {
+		chip_prev = chip_num;
+		chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num);
+		if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) {
  			res = chip;
-	}
+			break;
+		}
+	} while (chip_prev != chip_num);

  	mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);


Here you are keeping the loop, which I think is good and I would like 
you to keep it...


diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index d8e2e5bca903..b3907d3556ce 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -802,18 +802,19 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
  }

  /**
- * tpm_is_tpm2 - is the chip a TPM2 chip?
- * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or ANY
+ * tpm_is_tpm2 - do we a have a TPM2 chip?
   *
- * Returns < 0 on error, and 1 or 0 on success depending whether the chip
- * is a TPM2 chip.
+ * Return:
+ *     1 if we have a TPM2 chip.
+ *     0 if we don't have a TPM2 chip.
+ *     A negative number for system errors (errno).
   */
-int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
+int tpm_is_tpm2(void)
  {
  	struct tpm_chip *chip;
  	int rc;

-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
  	if (chip == NULL)
  		return -ENODEV;

@@ -826,22 +827,18 @@ int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_is_tpm2);

  /**
- * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value
- * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or ANY
- * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to retrieve
- * @res_buf:	TPM_PCR value
- *		size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
+ * tpm_pcr_read - read a PCR value from SHA1 bank
+ * @pcr_idx:	the PCR to be retrieved
+ * @res_buf:	the value of the PCR
   *
- * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
- * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
- * the module usage count.
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
   */
-int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
+int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
  {
  	struct tpm_chip *chip;
  	int rc;

-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
  	if (chip == NULL)
  		return -ENODEV;
  	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
@@ -882,16 +879,17 @@ static int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash,
  }

  /**
- * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
- * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or AN&
- * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to extend
- * @hash:	hash value used to extend pcr value
+ * tpm_pcr_extend - extend a PCR value in SHA1 bank.
+ * @pcr_idx:	the PCR to be retrieved
+ * @hash:	the hash value used to extend the PCR value
+ *
+ * Note: with TPM 2.0 extends also those banks with a known digest size to the
+ * cryto subsystem in order to prevent malicious use of those PCR banks. In the
+ * future we should dynamically determine digest sizes.
   *
- * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
- * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
- * the module usage count.
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
   */
-int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
+int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
  {


I think every kernel internal TPM driver API should be called with the 
tpm_chip as a parameter. This is in foresight of namespacing of IMA 
where we want to provide the flexibility of passing a dedicated vTPM to 
each namespace and IMA would use the chip as a parameter to all of these 
functions to talk to the right tpm_vtpm_proxy instance. From that 
perspective this patch goes into the wrong direction.

   Stefan

  	int rc;
  	struct tpm_chip *chip;
@@ -899,7 +897,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
  	u32 count = 0;
  	int i;

-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
  	if (chip == NULL)
  		return -ENODEV;

@@ -1012,12 +1010,12 @@ int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
  	return rc;
  }

-int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
+int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
  {
  	struct tpm_chip *chip;
  	int rc;

-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
  	if (chip == NULL)
  		return -ENODEV;

@@ -1120,14 +1118,13 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
  };

  /**
- * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
+ * tpm_get_random() - acquire random bytes
   * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes
   * @max: the max number of bytes to write to @out
   *
- * Returns < 0 on error and the number of bytes read on success
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
   */
-int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
+int tpm_get_random(u8 *out, size_t max)
  {
  	struct tpm_chip *chip;
  	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
@@ -1138,7 +1135,7 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
  	if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
  		return -EINVAL;

-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
  	if (chip == NULL)
  		return -ENODEV;

@@ -1181,21 +1178,22 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);

  /**
- * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
+ * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key payload
   * @options: authentication values and other options
   * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
   *
- * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips
- * are supported.
+ * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation
+ * is still located in the keyring subsystem.
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
   */
-int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
  		     struct trusted_key_options *options)
  {
  	struct tpm_chip *chip;
  	int rc;

-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
  	if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2))
  		return -ENODEV;

@@ -1207,21 +1205,22 @@ int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_seal_trusted);

  /**
- * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
+ * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key payload
   * @options: authentication values and other options
   * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
   *
- * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips
- * are supported.
+ * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation
+ * is still located in the keyring subsystem.
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
   */
-int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
  		       struct trusted_key_options *options)
  {
  	struct tpm_chip *chip;
  	int rc;

-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
  	if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2))
  		return -ENODEV;

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index c1866cc02e30..269c32bb3af0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec)
  		     delay_msec * 1000);
  };

-struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num);
+struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void);
  __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
  void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);

diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 5a090f5ab335..54cd6d903d31 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@

  #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20	/* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */

-/*
- * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
- */
-#define	TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF
-
  struct tpm_chip;
  struct trusted_key_payload;
  struct trusted_key_options;
@@ -53,44 +48,42 @@ struct tpm_class_ops {
  };

  #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
-
-extern int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num);
-extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
-extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
-extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
-extern int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max);
-extern int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
-			    struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+extern int tpm_is_tpm2(void);
+extern int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
+extern int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
+extern int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen);
+extern int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max);
+extern int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
  			    struct trusted_key_options *options);
-extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
-			      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
  			      struct trusted_key_options *options);
  #else
-static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
+static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(void)
  {
  	return -ENODEV;
  }
-static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
+static inline int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
+{
  	return -ENODEV;
  }
-static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
+static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
+{
  	return -ENODEV;
  }
-static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) {
+static inline int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
+{
  	return -ENODEV;
  }
-static inline int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max) {
+static inline int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max)
+{
  	return -ENODEV;
  }
-
-static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
-				   struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
  				   struct trusted_key_options *options)
  {
  	return -ENODEV;
  }
-static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
-				     struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
  				     struct trusted_key_options *options)
  {
  	return -ENODEV;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 802d5d20f36f..b5828bafab26 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
  	if (!ima_used_chip)
  		return;

-	if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
+	if (tpm_pcr_read(idx, pcr) != 0)
  		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
  }

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 2967d497a665..21be72f604cd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
  	int rc;

  	ima_used_chip = 0;
-	rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i);
+	rc = tpm_pcr_read(0, pcr_i);
  	if (rc == 0)
  		ima_used_chip = 1;

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index a02a86d51102..d33966ff210d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
  	if (!ima_used_chip)
  		return result;

-	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash);
+	result = tpm_pcr_extend(pcr, hash);
  	if (result != 0)
  		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
  	return result;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index ddfaebf60fc8..f912b5bffdad 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
   * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
   * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
   */
-static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
-			    size_t buflen)
+static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
  {
  	int rc;

  	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
-	rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
+	rc = tpm_send(cmd, buflen);
  	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
  	if (rc > 0)
  		/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
@@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)

  	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
  		return -EPERM;
-	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
  	if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
  		return ret;
-	return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+	return tpm_pcr_extend(pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
  }

  /*
@@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
  	unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
  	int ret;

-	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
  	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
  		return ret;

@@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
  	store32(tb, handle);
  	storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);

-	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
  	if (ret < 0)
  		return ret;

@@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
  	store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
  	store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
  	store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
-	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
  	if (ret < 0)
  		return ret;

@@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
  	if (ret < 0)
  		goto out;

-	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
  	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
  		goto out;
  	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
@@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
  	store8(tb, cont);
  	storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);

-	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
  	if (ret < 0)
  		goto out;

@@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,

  	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
  	keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
-	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
  	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
  		pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
  		return ret;
@@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
  	store8(tb, cont);
  	storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);

-	ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
  	if (ret < 0) {
  		pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
  		return ret;
@@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
  	int i;
  	int tpm2;

-	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
  	if (tpm2 < 0)
  		return tpm2;

@@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
  	struct trusted_key_options *options;
  	int tpm2;

-	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
  	if (tpm2 < 0)
  		return NULL;

@@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
  	size_t key_len;
  	int tpm2;

-	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
  	if (tpm2 < 0)
  		return tpm2;

@@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
  	switch (key_cmd) {
  	case Opt_load:
  		if (tpm2)
-			ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+			ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(payload, options);
  		else
  			ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
  		dump_payload(payload);
@@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
  		break;
  	case Opt_new:
  		key_len = payload->key_len;
-		ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
+		ret = tpm_get_random(payload->key, key_len);
  		if (ret != key_len) {
  			pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
  			goto out;
  		}
  		if (tpm2)
-			ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+			ret = tpm_seal_trusted(payload, options);
  		else
  			ret = key_seal(payload, options);
  		if (ret < 0)








