On Sat, Apr 30, 2022 at 9:12 AM Benjamin Tissoires
<benjamin.tissoires@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
[...]
> This is roughly what I have now:
>
> - hid-core is not aware of BPF except for a few __weak
> ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION hooks (dispatch_hid_bpf_device_event for
> example)
> - I have a separate hid-bpf module that attaches BPF traces to these
> hooks and calls a "dispatch" kfunc within hid-bpf
> - the dispatch function then do a succession of BPF calls to programs
> attached to it by using bpf_tail_call(prog_array, hid_id)
>
> - for the clients, they define one or more
> SEC("fmod_ret/hid_bpf_device_event"). That __weak hook is declared in
> the kernel by hid-bpf but is never called, it's just an API
> declaration
> - then clients call in a SEC("syscall")
> hid_bpf_attach_prog(ctx->prog_fd, ctx->hid_id, ctx->flags);
> - hid_bpf_attach_prog is a kfunc that takes a ref on the struct
> bpf_prog*, and stores that program in the correct struct bpf_map *for
> the given attached_btf_id (hid_bpf_device_event in our case)
>
> And that's about it.
> I still need to handle automatic release of the bpf prog when there is
> no userspace open fd on it unless it's pinned but I think this should
> be working fine.
>
> I also probably need to pin some SEC("syscall") (hid_bpf_attach_prog
> and hid_bpf_dettach_prog) so users don't have to write them down and
> can just use the ones provided by the kernel.
>
> The nice thing is that I can define my own API for the attach call
> without dealing with bpf core. I can thus add a priority flag that is
> relevant here because the data coming through the bpf program can be
> modified.
>
> The other thing is that now, I don't care which function we are in to
> decide if a RET_PTR_MEM is read only or not. I can deal with that by
> either playing with the flags or even replacing entirely the dispatch
> trace prog from userspace if I want to access the raw events.
>
> However, the downsides are:
> - I need to also define kfuncs for BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL (I don't
> think It'll be a big issue)
> - The only way I could store the bpf_prog into the map was to hack
> around the map ops, because the fd of the map in the skel is not
> available while doing a SEC("syscall") from a different process.
Update on this side: I realized that I could use the syscall
BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID instead to get an fd for the current task.
However, I've been bitten quite hard today because I was using
bpf_map_get() instead of bpf_map_get_with_uref(), and so every time I
closed the fd in the syscall the map was cleared...
But now I would like to have more than one program of a type per hid
device, meaning that I can not have only one bpf_map of type
BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY.
I have explored BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS, but we can not have
BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY as inner maps with the current code. And I'd
need 2 levels of nesting (which is not authorized today):
- hid_jmp_table (key: HID id)
- array of different program type per HID device (key: HID_BPF_PROG_TYPE)
- BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY with the actual progs (key: int)
The other solution would be to be able to create a map when needed,
store it in struct hid_device, and then call bpf_tail_call on this
map. The problem is that I need a way to teach the verifier that the
struct bpf_map pointer I have in the context is a true bpf_map...
Any input would be appreciated :)
Cheers,
Benjamin
>
> Also, I wonder if we should not have some way to namespace kfuncs.
> Ideally, I would like to prevent the usage of those kfuncs outside of
> some helpers that I define in HID so I don't have to worry too much
> about other trace programs fuzzing and segfaulting the kernel.
>
[...]
