When in_compat_syscall(), a user could make type != UHID_CREATE when get_user(type, buffer) [first fetch] and later make event->type == UHID_CREATE in copy_from_user(event, buffer, ...) [second fetch]. By doing so, an attacker might circumvent the specific logic to handle the type == UHID_CREATE case and later cause undefined behaviors. This patch enforces that event->type is overriden to the type value copied in the first fetch and thus, mitigate this race condition attack. Signed-off-by: Meng Xu <mengxu.gatech@xxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/hid/uhid.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c index 7f8ff39..4bbfd8a 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c @@ -448,11 +448,20 @@ static int uhid_event_from_user(const char __user *buffer, size_t len, kfree(compat); return 0; } + /* All others can be copied directly */ - } + if (copy_from_user(event, buffer, min(len, sizeof(*event)))) + return -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(event, buffer, min(len, sizeof(*event)))) - return -EFAULT; + /* + * Override type in case the user process rushes to change it + * between two fetches + * */ + event->type = type; + } else { + if (copy_from_user(event, buffer, min(len, sizeof(*event)))) + return -EFAULT; + } return 0; } -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-input" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html