On Fri, 2018-02-16 at 20:33 +0000, Taras Kondratiuk wrote:
> From: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> initramfs code supporting extended cpio format have ability to
> fill extended attributes from cpio archive, but if SELinux enabled
> and security server is not initialized yet, selinux callback would
> refuse setxattr made by initramfs code.
>
> Solution enable SBLABEL_MNT on rootfs even if secrurity server is
> not initialized yet.
What if we were to instead skip the SBLABEL_MNT check in
selinux_inode_setxattr() if !ss_initialized? Not dependent on
filesystem type.
>
> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 8644d864e3c1..f3fe65589f02 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -706,6 +706,18 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct
> super_block *sb,
>
> if (!ss_initialized) {
> if (!num_opts) {
> + /*
> + * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but
> supports
> + * setting SELinux context on in-core
> inodes.
> + *
> + * Chicken and egg problem: policy may
> reside in rootfs
> + * but for initramfs code to fill in
> attributes, it
> + * needs selinux to allow that.
> + */
> + if (!strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs",
> + sizeof("rootfs")))
> + sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
> +
> /* Defer initialization until
> selinux_complete_init,
> after the initial policy is loaded and
> the security
> server is ready to handle calls. */
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