On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:06 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >> This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This >> is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The >> work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port >> from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van >> Riel. >> >> This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when >> performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object >> being copied to/from: >> - address range doesn't wrap around >> - address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size) >> - if on the slab allocator: >> - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is >> implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches) >> - otherwise, object must not span page allocations >> - if on the stack >> - object must not extend before/after the current process task >> - object must be contained by the current stack frame (when there is >> arch/build support for identifying stack frames) >> - object must not overlap with kernel text >> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Tested-By: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@xxxxxx> >> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> --- >> arch/Kconfig | 7 ++ >> include/linux/slab.h | 12 +++ >> include/linux/thread_info.h | 15 +++ >> mm/Makefile | 4 + >> mm/usercopy.c | 234 >> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> security/Kconfig | 28 ++++++ >> 6 files changed, 300 insertions(+) >> create mode 100644 mm/usercopy.c >> >> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig >> index 5e2776562035..195ee4cc939a 100644 >> --- a/arch/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/Kconfig >> @@ -433,6 +433,13 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES >> and similar) by implementing an inline >> arch_within_stack_frames(), >> which is used by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. >> >> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING >> + bool >> + help >> + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear >> + mapping of the kernel text. This is used to verify that kernel >> + text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. >> + >> config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING >> bool >> help >> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h >> index aeb3e6d00a66..96a16a3fb7cb 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/slab.h >> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h >> @@ -155,6 +155,18 @@ void kfree(const void *); >> void kzfree(const void *); >> size_t ksize(const void *); >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR >> +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, >> + struct page *page); >> +#else >> +static inline const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, >> + unsigned long n, >> + struct page *page) >> +{ >> + return NULL; >> +} >> +#endif >> + >> /* >> * Some archs want to perform DMA into kmalloc caches and need a >> guaranteed >> * alignment larger than the alignment of a 64-bit integer. >> diff --git a/include/linux/thread_info.h b/include/linux/thread_info.h >> index 3d5c80b4391d..f24b99eac969 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/thread_info.h >> +++ b/include/linux/thread_info.h >> @@ -155,6 +155,21 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void >> * const stack, >> } >> #endif >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY >> +extern void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, >> + bool to_user); >> + >> +static inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, >> + bool to_user) >> +{ >> + __check_object_size(ptr, n, to_user); >> +} >> +#else >> +static inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, >> + bool to_user) >> +{ } >> +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */ >> + >> #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ >> >> #endif /* _LINUX_THREAD_INFO_H */ >> diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile >> index 78c6f7dedb83..32d37247c7e5 100644 >> --- a/mm/Makefile >> +++ b/mm/Makefile >> @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_memcontrol.o := n >> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mmzone.o := n >> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_vmstat.o := n >> >> +# Since __builtin_frame_address does work as used, disable the warning. >> +CFLAGS_usercopy.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, frame-address) >> + >> mmu-y := nommu.o >> mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) := gup.o highmem.o memory.o mincore.o \ >> mlock.o mmap.o mprotect.o mremap.o msync.o >> rmap.o \ >> @@ -99,3 +102,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_USERFAULTFD) += userfaultfd.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_IDLE_PAGE_TRACKING) += page_idle.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_FRAME_VECTOR) += frame_vector.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGE_REF) += debug_page_ref.o >> +obj-$(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY) += usercopy.o >> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..e4bf4e7ccdf6 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ >> +/* >> + * This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*, >> + * which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure >> + * and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based >> + * on PAX_USERCOPY, which is: >> + * >> + * Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source >> + * Security Inc. >> + * >> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify >> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as >> + * published by the Free Software Foundation. >> + * >> + */ >> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt >> + >> +#include <linux/mm.h> >> +#include <linux/slab.h> >> +#include <asm/sections.h> >> + >> +enum { >> + BAD_STACK = -1, >> + NOT_STACK = 0, >> + GOOD_FRAME, >> + GOOD_STACK, >> +}; >> + >> +/* >> + * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current >> + * stack frame (if possible). >> + * >> + * 0: not at all on the stack >> + * 1: fully within a valid stack frame >> + * 2: fully on the stack (when can't do frame-checking) >> + * -1: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame) >> + */ > > > Nit: update comments to match enum (BAD_STACK instead of -1 etc.) Ah, yes, thanks. I will fix this. >> +static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long >> len) >> +{ >> + const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current); >> + const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE; >> + int ret; >> + >> + /* Object is not on the stack at all. */ >> + if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj) >> + return NOT_STACK; >> + >> + /* >> + * Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the >> + * the check above means at least one end is within the stack, >> + * so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack). >> + */ >> + if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len) >> + return BAD_STACK; >> + >> + /* Check if object is safely within a valid frame. */ >> + ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len); >> + if (ret) >> + return ret; >> + >> + return GOOD_STACK; >> +} >> + >> +static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len, >> + bool to_user, const char *type) >> +{ >> + pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu >> bytes)\n", >> + to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite", >> + to_user ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len); >> + /* >> + * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), >> + * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch >> + * Oops code, so that is used here instead. >> + */ >> + BUG(); >> +} >> + >> +/* Returns true if any portion of [ptr,ptr+n) over laps with [low,high). >> */ >> +static bool overlaps(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, unsigned long low, >> + unsigned long high) >> +{ >> + unsigned long check_low = (uintptr_t)ptr; >> + unsigned long check_high = check_low + n; >> + >> + /* Does not overlap if entirely above or entirely below. */ >> + if (check_low >= high || check_high < low) >> + return false; >> + >> + return true; >> +} >> + >> +/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ >> +static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr, >> + unsigned long n) >> +{ >> + unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; >> + unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; >> + >> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) >> + return "<kernel text>"; >> + >> +#ifdef HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING >> + /* Check against linear mapping as well. */ >> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow)), >> + (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh)))) >> + return "<linear kernel text>"; >> +#endif >> + >> + return NULL; >> +} >> + >> +static inline const char *check_bogus_address(const void *ptr, unsigned >> long n) >> +{ >> + /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */ >> + if (ptr + n < ptr) >> + return "<wrapped address>"; >> + >> + /* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */ >> + if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr)) >> + return "<null>"; >> + >> + return NULL; >> +} >> + >> +static inline const char *check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned >> long n, >> + bool to_user) >> +{ >> + struct page *page, *endpage; >> + const void *end = ptr + n - 1; >> + >> + if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr)) >> + return NULL; >> + >> + page = virt_to_head_page(ptr); >> + >> + /* Check slab allocator for flags and size. */ >> + if (PageSlab(page)) >> + return __check_heap_object(ptr, n, page); >> + >> + /* >> + * Sometimes the kernel data regions are not marked Reserved (see >> + * check below). And sometimes [_sdata,_edata) does not cover >> + * rodata and/or bss, so check each range explicitly. >> + */ >> + >> + /* Allow reads of kernel rodata region (if not marked as >> Reserved). */ >> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata && >> + end <= (const void *)__end_rodata) { >> + if (!to_user) >> + return "<rodata>"; >> + return NULL; >> + } >> + >> + /* Allow kernel data region (if not marked as Reserved). */ >> + if (ptr >= (const void *)_sdata && end <= (const void *)_edata) >> + return NULL; >> + >> + /* Allow kernel bss region (if not marked as Reserved). */ >> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__bss_start && >> + end <= (const void *)__bss_stop) >> + return NULL; >> + >> + /* Is the object wholly within one base page? */ >> + if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) == >> + ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK))) >> + return NULL; >> + >> + /* Allow if start and end are inside the same compound page. */ >> + endpage = virt_to_head_page(end); >> + if (likely(endpage == page)) >> + return NULL; >> + >> + /* >> + * Reject if range is not Reserved (i.e. special or device >> memory), >> + * since then the object spans several independently allocated >> pages. >> + */ >> + for (; ptr <= end ; ptr += PAGE_SIZE, page = >> virt_to_head_page(ptr)) { >> + if (!PageReserved(page)) >> + return "<spans multiple pages>"; >> + } >> + > > > This doesn't work when copying CMA allocated memory since CMA purposely > allocates larger than a page block size without setting head pages. > Given CMA may be used with drivers doing zero copy buffers, I think it > should be permitted. > > Something like the following lets it pass (I can clean up and submit > the is_migrate_cma_page APIs as a separate patch for review) Yeah, this would be great. I'd rather use an accessor to check this than a direct check for MIGRATE_CMA. > > diff --git a/include/linux/mmzone.h b/include/linux/mmzone.h > index 02069c2..e9b0661 100644 > --- a/include/linux/mmzone.h > +++ b/include/linux/mmzone.h > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > #include <linux/page-flags-layout.h> > #include <linux/atomic.h> > #include <asm/page.h> > +#include <asm/pgtable.h> > /* Free memory management - zoned buddy allocator. */ > #ifndef CONFIG_FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER > @@ -85,6 +86,18 @@ extern int page_group_by_mobility_disabled; > get_pfnblock_flags_mask(page, page_to_pfn(page), \ > PB_migrate_end, MIGRATETYPE_MASK) > +#ifdef CONFIG_CMA > +static inline bool is_migrate_cma_page(struct page *page) > +{ > + return get_pageblock_migratetype(page) == MIGRATE_CMA; > +} > +#else > +static inline bool is_migrate_cma_page(struct page *page) > +{ > + return false; > +} > +#endif > + > struct free_area { > struct list_head free_list[MIGRATE_TYPES]; > unsigned long nr_free; > diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c > index e4bf4e7..15275ab 100644 > --- a/mm/usercopy.c > +++ b/mm/usercopy.c > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ > #include <linux/mm.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > +#include <linux/mmzone.h> > #include <asm/sections.h> > enum { > @@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ static inline const char *check_heap_object(const void > *ptr, unsigned long n, > * since then the object spans several independently allocated > pages. > */ > for (; ptr <= end ; ptr += PAGE_SIZE, page = virt_to_head_page(ptr)) > { > - if (!PageReserved(page)) > + if (!PageReserved(page) && !is_migrate_cma_page(page)) > return "<spans multiple pages>"; > } Yeah, I'll modify this a bit so that which type it starts as is maintained for all pages (rather than allowing to flip back and forth -- even though that is likely impossible). -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-ia64" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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