Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
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- To: "kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 12:23:11 -0700
- Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@xxxxxxxxx>, LKML <linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Rik van Riel <riel@xxxxxxxxxx>, Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, PaX Team <pageexec@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Brad Spengler <spender@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Russell King <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@xxxxxxxxx>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@xxxxxxxxx>, "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "x86@xxxxxxxxxx" <x86@xxxxxxxxxx>, Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@xxxxxxxxxx>, David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@xxxxxxx>, Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>, Mathias Krause <minipli@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>, Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>, Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "linux-arm-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <linux-arm-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-ia64@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "linuxppc-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <linuxppc-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, sparclinux <sparclinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-arch <linux-arch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx>
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On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 12:19 PM, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> I'd like it to dump stack and be fatal to the process involved, but
>> yeah, I guess BUG() would work. Creating an infrastructure for
>> handling security-related Oopses can be done separately from this
>> (and
>> I'd like to see that added, since it's a nice bit of configurable
>> reactivity to possible attacks).
>
> In grsecurity, the oops handling also uses do_group_exit instead of
> do_exit but both that change (or at least the option to do it) and the
> exploit handling could be done separately from this without actually
> needing special treatment for USERCOPY. Could expose is as something
> like panic_on_oops=2 as a balance between the existing options.
I'm also uncomfortable about BUG() being removed by unsetting
CONFIG_BUG, but that seems unlikely. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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