On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 12:35 AM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > >> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the >> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. >> >> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. >> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > >> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c >> index 825ff4505336..0c8ace04f075 100644 >> --- a/mm/slub.c >> +++ b/mm/slub.c >> @@ -3614,6 +3614,33 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) >> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node); >> #endif >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY >> +/* >> + * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized. >> + * >> + * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache >> + * to indicate an error. >> + */ >> +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, >> + struct page *page) >> +{ >> + struct kmem_cache *s; >> + unsigned long offset; >> + >> + /* Find object. */ >> + s = page->slab_cache; >> + >> + /* Find offset within object. */ >> + offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; >> + >> + /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */ >> + if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset) >> + return NULL; >> + >> + return s->name; >> +} > > I gave this a quick spin on powerpc, it blew up immediately :) Wheee :) This series is rather easy to test: blows up REALLY quickly if it's wrong. ;) FWIW, -next also has a bunch of additional lkdtm tests for the various protections and directions. > > Brought up 16 CPUs > usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to c0000001fe023868 (kmalloc-16) (9 bytes) > CPU: 8 PID: 103 Comm: kdevtmpfs Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3-00098-g09d9556ae5d1 #55 > Call Trace: > [c0000001fa0cfb40] [c0000000009bdbe8] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0 (unreliable) > [c0000001fa0cfb80] [c00000000029cf44] __check_object_size+0x74/0x320 > [c0000001fa0cfc00] [c00000000005d4d0] copy_from_user+0x60/0xd4 > [c0000001fa0cfc40] [c00000000022b6cc] memdup_user+0x5c/0xf0 > [c0000001fa0cfc80] [c00000000022b90c] strndup_user+0x7c/0x110 > [c0000001fa0cfcc0] [c0000000002d6c28] SyS_mount+0x58/0x180 > [c0000001fa0cfd10] [c0000000005ee908] devtmpfsd+0x98/0x210 > [c0000001fa0cfd80] [c0000000000df810] kthread+0x110/0x130 > [c0000001fa0cfe30] [c0000000000095e8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74 > > SLUB tracing says: > > TRACE kmalloc-16 alloc 0xc0000001fe023868 inuse=186 fp=0x (null) > > Which is not 16-byte aligned, which seems to be caused by the red zone? > The following patch fixes it for me, but I don't know SLUB enough to say > if it's always correct. > > > diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c > index 0c8ace04f075..66191ea4545a 100644 > --- a/mm/slub.c > +++ b/mm/slub.c > @@ -3630,6 +3630,9 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, > /* Find object. */ > s = page->slab_cache; > > + /* Subtract red zone if enabled */ > + ptr = restore_red_left(s, ptr); > + Ah, interesting. Just to make sure: you've built with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and either CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON or booted with either slub_debug or slub_debug=z ? Thanks for the slub fix! I wonder if this code should be using size_from_object() instead of s->size? (It looks like slab is already handling this via the obj_offset() call.) -Kees > /* Find offset within object. */ > offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; > > cheers -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-ia64" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
![]() |