On 8/20/2021 12:21 PM, hch@xxxxxx wrote:
On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 06:14:51PM +0000, Michael Kelley wrote:
+ if (!pfns)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size / HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE; i++)
+ pfns[i] = virt_to_hvpfn(buf + i * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE)
+ + (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary >> HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+ vaddr = vmap_pfn(pfns, size / HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL_IO);
+ kfree(pfns);
+
+ return vaddr;
+}
This function appears to be a duplicate of hv_map_memory() in Patch 11 of this
series. Is it possible to structure things so there is only one implementation? In
So right now it it identical, but there is an important difference:
the swiotlb memory is physically contiguous to start with, so we can
do the simple remap using vmap_range as suggested in the last mail.
The cases here are pretty weird in that netvsc_remap_buf is called right
after vzalloc. That is we create _two_ mappings in vmalloc space right
after another, where the original one is just used for establishing the
"GPADL handle" and freeing the memory. In other words, the obvious thing
to do here would be to use a vmalloc variant that allows to take the
shared_gpa_boundary into account when setting up the PTEs.
The buffer is allocated via vmalloc(). It needs to be marked as host
visible via hyperv hvcall before being accessed via address space above
shared_gpa_boundary. The hvcall is called in the vmbus_establish_gpadl().
And here is somthing I need help from the x86 experts: does the CPU
actually care about this shared_gpa_boundary? Or does it just matter
for the generated DMA address? Does somehow have a good pointer to
how this mechanism works?
The shared_gpa_boundary is vTOM feature of AMD SEV-SNP. Tom Lendacky
introduced the feature in previous mail. I copy it here and please have
a look.
From Tom Lendacky:
IIUC, this is using the vTOM feature of SEV-SNP. When this feature is
enabled for a VMPL level, any physical memory addresses below vTOM are
considered private/encrypted and any physical memory addresses above vTOM
are considered shared/unencrypted. With this option, you don't need a
fully enlightened guest that sets and clears page table encryption bits.
You just need the DMA buffers to be allocated in the proper range above
vTOM.
See the section on "Virtual Machine Privilege Levels" in
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf.
