> I agree if the intent is to deal with a untrusted host, I can follow the same principle to add this support to all requests to VSP. But this is a different problem to what this patch intends to address. I can see they may share the same design principle and common code. My question on a untrusted host is: If a host is untrusted and is misbehaving on purpose, what's the point of keep the VM running and not crashing the PCI driver? I think the principle can be summarized with "keep the VM _running, if you can handle the misbehaviour (possibly, warning on "something wrong/unexpected just happened"); crash, otherwise". Of course, this is just a principle: the exact meaning of that 'handle' should be leverage case by case (which I admittedly haven't here); I'm thinking, e.g., at corresponding complexity/performance impacts and risks of 'mis-assessments'. Thanks, Andrea
