On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 09:59:31AM +0100, Andrea Parri wrote:
On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 02:47:56AM +0000, Michael Kelley wrote:
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 6:22 PM
>
> From: "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" <parri.andrea@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> [ Upstream commit 206ad34d52a2f1205c84d08c12fc116aad0eb407 ]
>
> Lack of validation could lead to out-of-bound reads and information
> leaks (cf. usage of nvdev->chan_table[]). Check that the number of
> allocated sub-channels fits into the expected range.
>
> Suggested-by: Saruhan Karademir <skarade@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@xxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Link:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hyperv/20201118153310.112404-1-parri.andrea@xxxxxxxxx/
> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
Sasha -- This patch is one of an ongoing group of patches where a Linux
guest running on Hyper-V will start assuming that hypervisor behavior might
be malicious, and guards against such behavior. Because this is a new
assumption, these patches are more properly treated as new functionality
rather than as bug fixes. So I would propose that we *not* bring such patches
back to stable branches.
Thank you, Michael. Just to confirm, I agree with Michael's assessment
above and I join his proposal to *not* backport such patches to stable.
I'll drop it then, thanks.
--
Thanks,
Sasha
