This closes the security issue of a execute of a binary which is disallowed in the lower layers with mount flags, but are able to execute with overlayfs. This circumvention can be done by users using fusermounts as well. nosuid[1] and noexec[2] has been attempted earlier, but with no review/response. Perhaps a discussion would be helpful. [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg00379.html [2] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg00381.html Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@xxxxxxxx> --- fs/block_dev.c | 2 +- fs/exec.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 13 ++++++++++++- include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++++ security/commoncap.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index 826b164..85697d2 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -1841,7 +1841,7 @@ struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *pathname) if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) goto fail; error = -EACCES; - if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) + if (path_nodev(&path)) goto fail; error = -ENOMEM; bdev = bd_acquire(inode); diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index dcd4ac7..ff1b20b 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -104,6 +104,20 @@ bool path_noexec(const struct path *path) (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC); } +bool path_nosuid(const struct path *path) +{ + return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) || + (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOSUID); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(path_nosuid); + +bool path_nodev(const struct path *path) +{ + return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) || + (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NODEV); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(path_nodev); + #ifdef CONFIG_USELIB /* * Note that a shared library must be both readable and executable due to @@ -1295,7 +1309,7 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); - if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + if (path_nosuid(&bprm->file->f_path)) return; if (task_no_new_privs(current)) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 9c590e0..6027fbe 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -2752,7 +2752,7 @@ static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag) break; case S_IFBLK: case S_IFCHR: - if (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) + if (path_nodev(path)) return -EACCES; /*FALLTHRU*/ case S_IFIFO: diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 619ad4b..569a04a 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -1019,6 +1019,12 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) pr_err("overlayfs: failed to clone upperpath\n"); goto out_put_lowerpath; } + if (ufs->upper_mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOSUID; + if (ufs->upper_mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC; + if (ufs->upper_mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NODEV; ufs->workdir = ovl_workdir_create(ufs->upper_mnt, workpath.dentry); err = PTR_ERR(ufs->workdir); @@ -1047,7 +1053,12 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) * will fail instead of modifying lower fs. */ mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY; - + if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOSUID; + if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC; + if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NODEV; ufs->lower_mnt[ufs->numlower] = mnt; ufs->numlower++; } diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index ae68100..b38835b 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -1281,6 +1281,8 @@ struct mm_struct; /* sb->s_iflags */ #define SB_I_CGROUPWB 0x00000001 /* cgroup-aware writeback enabled */ #define SB_I_NOEXEC 0x00000002 /* Ignore executables on this fs */ +#define SB_I_NODEV 0x00000004 /* Ignore devs on this fs */ +#define SB_I_NOSUID 0x00000008 /* Disallow suid on this fs */ /* Possible states of 'frozen' field */ enum { @@ -3076,6 +3078,8 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) } extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); +extern bool path_nosuid(const struct path *path); +extern bool path_nodev(const struct path *path); extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 48071ed..32f3140 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c if (!file_caps_enabled) return 0; - if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + if (path_nosuid(&bprm->file->f_path)) return 0; rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index f1ab715..c4725cc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2234,7 +2234,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); - int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID); + int nosuid = path_nosuid(&bprm->file->f_path); int rc; if (!nnp && !nosuid) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
