Re: Orangefs, v4.5 and the merge window...

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> either merge it
> before -rc1 and fix it up by -rc3 or so, or fix it during the
> window and merge at around -rc2 - I'm fine with either
> variant.

We've kept a list we made from all those mail messages
so we could check off things we've tried to address, I
was looking at it yesterday and I know it is not up-to-date,
but we'll work to get it that way. The second option
might be safer unless you help us again, I don't want
to sign a rubber check to Linus.

-Mike

On Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 4:47 PM, Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 03:18:57PM -0500, Mike Marshall wrote:
>> Greetings...
>>
>> The Orangefs for-next tree is:
>>
>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hubcap/linux.git
>> for-next
>>
>> I did a test merge (just locally, not pushed out) of Orangefs:for-next
>> and v4.5-rc7 so I could test out how I think I need to patch for
>> the follow_link -> get_link change, the diff is below.
>>
>> On Monday next, assuming that v4.5 is finalized this weekend,
>> I plan to do a actual merge with v4.5, apply the get_link patch
>> and push that to Orangefs:for-next.
>>
>> Hi Al <g>... might we get an ACK this time around?
>
> You do realize that it will mean fun few weeks post-merge fixing the rest of
> problems, right?  FWIW, I think that right now it *is* at the state where it
> such fixing is feasible, so modulo that...
>
> As far as I can see, waiting-related logics should be solid by now, ditto
> for lifetime rules; sanitizing the input...  listxattr still does need fixing
> (feed it a negative in ->downcall.resp.listxattr.lengths[0] and watch Bad
> Things(tm) happen; no idea why would anyone go for
> fs/orangefs/downcall.h:82:      __s32 lengths[ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_LISTLEN];
> for representing string lengths in the first place, but that's what you've
> got there and no sanity checks are done on it beyond
>                 if (total + new_op->downcall.resp.listxattr.lengths[i] > size)
>                         goto done;
> which is not enough - not with total and size being ssize_t and ...lengths[] -
> signed 32bit).
>
> The logics around maintaining the list of orangefs superblocks (add/remove/
> traverse) needs fixing; right now ioctl(..., ORANGEFS_DEV_REMOUNT_ALL) will
> walk through it with only request_mutex held.  Both insertion and removal
> are protected only by orangefs_superblocks_lock, and removal is insane -
>         struct list_head *tmp_safe = NULL;                              \
>         struct orangefs_sb_info_s *orangefs_sb = NULL;                  \
>                                                                         \
>         spin_lock(&orangefs_superblocks_lock);                          \
>         list_for_each_safe(tmp, tmp_safe, &orangefs_superblocks) {      \
>                 orangefs_sb = list_entry(tmp,                           \
>                                       struct orangefs_sb_info_s,        \
>                                       list);                            \
>                 if (orangefs_sb && (orangefs_sb->sb == sb)) {           \
>                         gossip_debug(GOSSIP_SUPER_DEBUG,                \
>                             "Removing SB %p from orangefs superblocks\n",      \
>                         orangefs_sb);                                   \
>                         list_del(&orangefs_sb->list);                   \
>                         break;                                          \
>                 }                                                       \
>         }                                                               \
>         spin_unlock(&orangefs_superblocks_lock);                        \
> list_entry is never NULL, for starters, and since there is a pointer back
> from superblock to that orangefs_sb_info, there's no reason to walk the entire
> list to find one.  BTW, both add_orangefs_sb() and remove_orangefs_sb() should
> be taken to their sole users.
>
> Sanity aside, there's really no lock in common for list modifiers and list
> walker I'd mentioned above.  FWIW, I would make orangefs_remount()
> take struct orangefs_sb_info instead of struct super_block and flipped the
> order of operations in orangefs_kill_sb() - kill_anon_super() *first*, then
> remove from the list, then tell the userland that it's going away (i.e.
> call orangefs_unmount_sb()).  request_mutex in the last one would, at least,
> prevent freeing the sucker before orangefs_remount() is done with it.
>
> Walking the list and calling orangefs_remount() on everything would still need
> care - you'd need to hold orangefs_superblocks_lock, drop it for actual calls
> of orangefs_remount() and have list removal preserve the forward pointer.
>
> That's probably the worst remaining locking issue I see in there.  Doable,
> if not pleasant...
>
> IIRC, there also had been some unpleasantness with getattr messing ->i_mode
> halfway through... <checks>  Yes - copy_attributes_to_inode() will be called,
> and do
>         inode->i_mode = orangefs_inode_perms(attrs);
> ...
>                 inode->i_mode |= S_IFLNK;
> ...
>                         strncpy(orangefs_inode->link_target,
>                                 symname,
>                                 ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX);
> If nothing else, *another* stat(2) racing with this one could pick the
> intermediate value of ->i_mode and proceed to report it to userland.
> Another problem is overwriting the symlink body; that can get very
> unpleasant, since it might be traversed by another syscall right at that
> moment.  Any change of a symlink body means "we'd missed it going stale";
> there is no way to change a symlink contents without removing it and
> creating a new one.  Should anything other than orangefs_iget() even bother
> copying it?  The same goes for inode type changes, of course (regular
> vs. directory vs. symlink, etc.).
>
> Speaking of orangefs_iget(), orangefs_set_inode() is pointlessly paranoid.
> Not a bug per se, but
>         struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = NULL;
>
>         /* Make sure that we have sane parameters */
>         if (!data || !inode)
>                 return 0;
>         orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
>         if (!orangefs_inode)
>                 return 0;
> is all wrong - 'data' is the last argument passed to iget5_locked (i.e. 'ref'
> of orangefs_iget()) and that's always an address of either a local variable
> or of a field in a large structure, and not even the first one; 'inode'
> is never NULL - it's the address of struct inode the caller is about to
> insert into the hash chain; ORANGEFS_I() is container_of(), so it's not
> going to be NULL either.
>
> I'll need to look through the archived threads to see if there's anything
> else left; IIRC, debugfs-related code had seriously nasty issues in case of
> allocation failures, but those were fairly isolated.  I'll read through the
> archive tomorrow and see if there's anything else mentioned and not dealt
> with; I don't remember anything really bad, but it had been well over
> a hundred mails starting about half a year ago; I sure as hell do not
> remember every tangential subthread in all of that, so I'll need to recheck.
>
> I _think_ that all remaining issues can be quickly dealt with, and the code
> has zero impact on the rest of the kernel.  I wouldn't risk putting it into
> -final without fixups, but as for the merge schedule... either merge it
> before -rc1 and fix it up by -rc3 or so, or fix it during the window and
> merge at around -rc2 - I'm fine with either variant.
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