On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 10:55:30AM +0800, Ian Kent wrote: > You know, wrt. the mechanism Oleg suggested, I've been wondering if it's > even necessary to capture process template information for execution. > > Isn't the main issue the execution of unknown arbitrary objects getting > access to a privileged context? > > Then perhaps it is sufficient to require registration of an SHA hash (of > some sort) for these objects by a suitably privileged process and only > allow helper execution of valid objects. That executable probably also depends on libraries, services, and tons of other miscellaneous stuff in its environment. The NFSv4 client idmapper, for example, may be doing ldap calls. Unless the helper is created with incredible care, I don't think that it's enough just to verify that you're executing the correct helper. --b. > > If that is sufficient then helper execution from within a container or > user namespace could just use the callers environment itself. > > What else do we need to be wary of, any thoughts Eric? > > Ian -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
