On 10/13/2015 10:04 AM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
> differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
> potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
> way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
> from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
> access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
> consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
> smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
> with the label supplied in the xattr.
>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Aside from the one comment below (which I can be talked out of)
this looks fine.
> ---
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 621200f86b56..bee0b2652bf4 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -891,6 +891,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
> struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
> struct inode_smack *isp;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
> int rc;
>
> if (bprm->cred_prepared)
> @@ -900,6 +901,10 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
> return 0;
>
> + sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
Call me old fashioned, but how about
if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) && isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
naked '&'s give me the willies.
> + return 0;
> +
> if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
> struct task_struct *tracer;
> rc = 0;
> @@ -1703,6 +1708,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
> struct task_smack *tsp;
> struct smack_known *okp;
> struct inode_smack *isp;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
> int may;
> int mmay;
> int tmay;
> @@ -1714,6 +1720,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
> isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
> if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
> return 0;
> + sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
> + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
> + isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
> + return -EACCES;
> mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
>
> tsp = current_security();
> @@ -3492,16 +3502,14 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> if (rc >= 0)
> transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
> }
> - if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) {
> - /*
> - * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
> - */
> - skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
> - if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
> - skp == &smack_known_web)
> - skp = NULL;
> - isp->smk_task = skp;
> - }
> + /*
> + * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
> + */
> + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
> + if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
> + skp == &smack_known_web)
> + skp = NULL;
> + isp->smk_task = skp;
>
> skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
> if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
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