This patch extends smack capability functions to a full list to those
equivalent in the kernel
has_ns_capability -> smack_has_ns_privilege
has_capability -> smack_has_privilege
ns_capable -> smack_ns_privileged
capable -> smack_privileged
It also puts the smack related part to a common function:
smack_capability_allowed()
Those functions will be needed for capability checks in the upcoming
Smack namespace patches.
Additionally there were 2 smack capability checks that used generic
capability functions instead of specific Smack ones effectively ignoring
the onlycap rule. This has been fixed now with the introduction of those
new functions.
This has implications on the Smack namespace as well as the additional
Smack checks in smack_capability_allowed() will be extended beyond the
onlycap rule. Not using Smack specific checks in those 2 places could
mean breaking the Smack label namespace separation.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++++
security/smack/smack_access.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +--
3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index fff0c61..ca8fb7c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -300,6 +300,11 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+int smack_has_ns_privilege(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+ int cap);
+int smack_has_privilege(struct task_struct *task, int cap);
+int smack_ns_privileged(struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap);
int smack_privileged(int cap);
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index bc1053f..72f848e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -629,14 +629,16 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
/*
- * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
- * by the onlycap rule.
+ * Internal smack capability check complimentary to the
+ * set of kernel capable() and has_capability() functions
*
- * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not.
+ * For a capability in smack related checks to be effective it needs to:
+ * - be allowed to be privileged by the onlycap rule.
+ * - be in the initial user ns
*/
-int smack_privileged(int cap)
+static int smack_capability_allowed(struct smack_known *skp,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
struct smack_onlycap *sop;
/*
@@ -645,7 +647,7 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap)
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
return 1;
- if (!capable(cap))
+ if (user_ns != &init_user_ns)
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -664,3 +666,53 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap)
return 0;
}
+
+/*
+ * Is the task privileged in a namespace and allowed to be privileged
+ * by additional smack rules.
+ */
+int smack_has_ns_privilege(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+ int cap)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(task);
+
+ if (!has_ns_capability(task, user_ns, cap))
+ return 0;
+ if (smack_capability_allowed(skp, user_ns))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by additional smack rules.
+ */
+int smack_has_privilege(struct task_struct *task, int cap)
+{
+ return smack_has_ns_privilege(task, &init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Is the current task privileged in a namespace and allowed to be privileged
+ * by additional smack rules.
+ */
+int smack_ns_privileged(struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ if (!ns_capable(user_ns, cap))
+ return 0;
+ if (smack_capability_allowed(skp, user_ns))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Is the current task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by additional smack rules.
+ */
+int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+ return smack_ns_privileged(&init_user_ns, cap);
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index c439370..198d3d6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
rc = 0;
else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
rc = -EACCES;
- else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ else if (smack_has_privilege(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
rc = 0;
else
rc = -EACCES;
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
skp = file->f_security;
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
- if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (rc != 0 && smack_has_privilege(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
--
2.4.3
--
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