From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> - Consolidate the testing if a device node may be opened in a new function may_open_dev. - Move the check for allowing access to device nodes on filesystems not mounted in the initial user namespace from mount time to open time and include it in may_open_dev. This set of changes removes the implicit adding of MNT_NODEV which simplifies the logic in fs/namespace.c and removes a potentially problematic difference in how normal and unprivileged mount namespaces work. This is a user visible change in behavior for remount in unpriviliged mount namespaces but is unlikely to cause problems for existing software. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> --- fs/block_dev.c | 2 +- fs/namei.c | 9 ++++++++- fs/namespace.c | 18 ++++-------------- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index 073bb57adab1..46bd98482f71 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *pathname) if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) goto fail; error = -EACCES; - if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) + if (!may_open_dev(&path)) goto fail; error = -ENOMEM; bdev = bd_acquire(inode); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 726d211db484..fcc5751d6395 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -2663,6 +2663,13 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_create); +bool may_open_dev(const struct path *path) +{ + return !(path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) && + ((path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns == &init_user_ns) || + (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)); +} + static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag) { struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; @@ -2685,7 +2692,7 @@ static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag) break; case S_IFBLK: case S_IFCHR: - if (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) + if (!may_open_dev(path)) return -EACCES; /*FALLTHRU*/ case S_IFIFO: diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index d023a353dc63..da70f7c4ece1 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -2177,13 +2177,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags, } if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) && !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) { - /* Was the nodev implicitly added in mount? */ - if ((mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) && - !(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) { - mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV; - } else { - return -EPERM; - } + return -EPERM; } if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) && !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) { @@ -2396,13 +2390,6 @@ static int do_new_mount(struct path *path, const char *fstype, int flags, put_filesystem(type); return -EPERM; } - /* Only in special cases allow devices from mounts - * created outside the initial user namespace. - */ - if (!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) { - flags |= MS_NODEV; - mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV | MNT_LOCK_NODEV; - } if (type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_VISIBLE) { if (!fs_fully_visible(type, &mnt_flags)) return -EPERM; @@ -3238,6 +3225,9 @@ static bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *type, int *new_mnt_flags) mnt_flags = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags; if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC) mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_LOCK_NOSUID | MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC); + if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && + !(mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) + mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_LOCK_NODEV); /* Verify the mount flags are equal to or more permissive * than the proposed new mount. diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 79c15ab2159d..5ec201e8308c 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -1537,6 +1537,7 @@ extern void dentry_unhash(struct dentry *dentry); */ extern void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir, umode_t mode); +extern bool may_open_dev(const struct path *path); /* * VFS FS_IOC_FIEMAP helper definitions. */ -- 1.9.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html