On 07/22/2015 12:14 PM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 12:02:13PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 07/16/2015 09:23 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On 07/15/2015 03:46 PM, Seth Forshee wrote:
>>>> Unprivileged users should not be able to supply security labels
>>>> in filesystems, nor should they be able to supply security
>>>> contexts in unprivileged mounts. For any mount where s_user_ns is
>>>> not init_user_ns, force the use of SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE behavior
>>>> and return EPERM if any contexts are supplied in the mount
>>>> options.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>
>>> I think this is obsoleted by the subsequent discussion, but just for the
>>> record: this patch would cause the files in the userns mount to be left
>>> with the "unlabeled" label, and therefore under typical policies,
>>> completely inaccessible to any process in a confined domain.
>>
>> The right way to handle this for SELinux would be to automatically use
>> mountpoint labeling (SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT, normally set by
>> specifying a context= mount option), with the sbsec->mntpoint_sid set
>> from some related object (e.g. the block device file context, as in your
>> patches for Smack). That will cause SELinux to use that value instead
>> of any xattr value from the filesystem and will cause attempts by
>> userspace to set the security.selinux xattr to fail on that filesystem.
>> That is how SELinux normally deals with untrusted filesystems, except
>> that it is normally specified as a mount option by a trusted mounting
>> process, whereas in your case you need to automatically set it.
>
> Excellent, thank you for the advice. I'll start on this when I've
> finished with Smack.
Not tested, but something like this should work. Note that it should
come after the call to security_fs_use() so we know whether SELinux
would even try to use xattrs supplied by the filesystem in the first place.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 564079c..84da3a2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -745,6 +745,30 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
goto out;
}
}
+
+ /*
+ * If this is a user namespace mount, no contexts are allowed
+ * on the command line and security labels must be ignored.
+ */
+ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
+ if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
+ defcontext_sid) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+ struct block_device *bdev = sb->s_bdev;
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+ if (bdev) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec =
bdev->bd_inode;
+ sbsec->mntpoint_sid = isec->sid;
+ } else {
+ sbsec->mntpoint_sid = current_sid();
+ }
+ }
+ goto out_set_opts;
+ }
+
/* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
if (fscontext_sid) {
rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec,
cred);
@@ -813,6 +837,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
}
+out_set_opts:
rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
out:
mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
