Potential security improvement in rootfs "/" from transversal directory attack

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Hi all, I'm new to this mailing list and to kernel devs in general. Hope we'll have good time together. And thanks in advance for your time and all.

Clarification:
With rootfs I mean the root of the roots of the file systems mounted. Upon which are mounted the others file systems.

Context-Problem:
In a transversal directory attack, in which the attacker doesn't know which is the relative path to start with the attack (which is read/write doesn't care) an attacker could exploit the fact that the rootfs has a ".." dir entry in the "/" dir to be sure to browse the correct "/" by concatenating a series of "../../" repeated n times (with n>=current_depth_of_directory ; this is easy to do with a big n). Reached the "/" he could go in the preferred path. Then the dangerousness depends from the achieved privileges.

Question:
Wouldn't be better to have the rootfs, that in the root directory "/" doesn't have a dir entry ".." to itself? 
Would this change creates problems to the kernel or the user space programs?
Why is this solution in place? Is just a Unix convention or something more (w.r.t Unix)?


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