On Thu, 2015-05-28 at 11:44 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > > > On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 11:27 AM, Eric W. Biederman > > <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 7:29 AM, Alexander Larsson < > > > > alexl@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > On Thu, 2015-04-02 at 07:06 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 3:12 AM, James Bottomley > > > > > > <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > On Tue, 2015-03-31 at 16:17 +0200, Alexander Larsson > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On tis, 2015-03-31 at 17:08 +0300, James Bottomley > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Tue, 2015-03-31 at 06:59 -0700, Andy Lutomirski > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't think that this is correct. That user can > > > > > > > > > > already create a > > > > > > > > > > nested userns and map themselves as 0 inside it. > > > > > > > > > > Then they can mount > > > > > > > > > > devpts. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't mind if they create a container and control > > > > > > > > > the isolated ttys in > > > > > > > > > that sub container in the VPS; that's fine. I do > > > > > > > > > mind if they get > > > > > > > > > access to the ttys in the VPS. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If you can convince me (and the rest of Linux) that > > > > > > > > > the tty subsystem > > > > > > > > > should be mountable by an unprivileged user > > > > > > > > > generally, then what you > > > > > > > > > propose is OK. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That is controlled by the general rights to mount > > > > > > > > stuff. I.e. unless you > > > > > > > > have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the VPS container you will not be > > > > > > > > able to mount > > > > > > > > devpts there. You can only do it in a subcontainer > > > > > > > > where you got > > > > > > > > permissions to mount via using user namespaces. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OK let me try again. Fine, if you want to speak > > > > > > > capabilities, you've > > > > > > > given a non-root user an unexpected capability (the > > > > > > > capability of > > > > > > > creating a ptmx device). But you haven't used a > > > > > > > capability separation > > > > > > > to do this, you've just hard coded it via a mount > > > > > > > parameter mechanism. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If you want to do this thing, do it properly, so it's > > > > > > > acceptable to the > > > > > > > whole of Linux, not a special corner case for one > > > > > > > particular type of > > > > > > > container. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Security breaches are created when people code in > > > > > > > special, little used, > > > > > > > corner cases because they don't get as thoroughly tested > > > > > > > and inspected > > > > > > > as generally applicable mechanisms. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > What you want is to be able to use the tty subsystem as a > > > > > > > non root user: > > > > > > > fine, but set that up globally, don't hide it in > > > > > > > containers so a lot > > > > > > > fewer people care. > > > > > > > > > > > > I tend to agree, and not just for the tty subsystem. This > > > > > > is an > > > > > > attack surface issue. With unprivileged user namespaces, > > > > > > unprivileged > > > > > > users can create mount namespaces (probably a good thing > > > > > > for bind > > > > > > mounts, etc), network namespaces (reasonably safe by > > > > > > themselves), > > > > > > network interfaces and iptables rules (scary), fresh > > > > > > instances/superblocks of some filesystems (scariness > > > > > > depends on the fs > > > > > > -- tmpfs is probably fine), and more. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think we should have real controls for this, and this is > > > > > > mostly > > > > > > Eric's domain. Eric? A silly issue that sometimes > > > > > > prevents devpts > > > > > > from being mountable isn't a real control, though. > > > > > > I thought the controls for limiting how much of the userspace API > > > an application could use were called seccomp and seccomp2. > > > > > > Do we need something like a PAM module so that we can set up > > > these > > > controls during login? > > > > > > > > I'm honestly surprised that non-root is allowed to mount > > > > > things in > > > > > general with user namespaces. This was long disabled use for > > > > > non-root in > > > > > Fedora, but it is now enabled. > > > > > > > > > > For instance, using loopback mounted files you could probably > > > > > attack > > > > > some of the less well tested filesystem implementations by > > > > > feeding them > > > > > fuzzed data. > > > > > > > > > > > > > You actually can't do that right now. Filesystems have to opt > > > > in to > > > > being mounted in unprivileged user namespaces, and no > > > > filesystems with > > > > backing stores have opted in. devpts has, but it's buggy > > > > without this > > > > patch IMO. > > > > > > Arguably you should use two user namespaces. The first to do > > > what you > > > want to as root the second to run as the uid you want to run as. > > > > > > > > Anyway, I don't see how this affects devpts though. If you're > > > > > running in > > > > > a container (or uncontained), as a regular users with no > > > > > mount > > > > > capabilities you can already mount a devpts filesystem if you > > > > > create a > > > > > subbcontainer with user namespaces and map your uid to 0 in > > > > > the > > > > > subcontainer. Then you get a new ptmx device that you can do > > > > > whatever > > > > > you want with. The mount option would let you do the same, > > > > > except be > > > > > your regular uid in the subcontainer. > > > > > > > > > > The only difference outside of the subcontainer is that if > > > > > the outer > > > > > container has no uid 0 mapped, yet the user has CAP_SYSADMIN > > > > > rights in > > > > > that container. Then he can mount devpts in the outer > > > > > container where he > > > > > before could only mount it in an inner container. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Agreed. Also, devpts doesn't seem scary at all to me from a > > > > userns > > > > perspective. Regular users on normal systems can already use > > > > ptmx, > > > > and AFAICS basically all of the attack surface is already > > > > available > > > > through the normal /dev/ptmx node. > > > > > > My only real take is that there are a lot more places that you > > > need to > > > tweak beyond devpts. So this patch seemed lacking and boring. > > > > > > Beyond that until I get the mount namespace sorted out things are > > > pretty > > > much in a feature freeze because I can't multitask well enough to > > > do > > > complicated patches and take feature patches. > > > > > > > Eric, do you think you have time now to take a look at this patch? > > I am much closer. Escaping bind mounts is still not yet fixed but I > have code that almost works. > > My gut feel still says that two user namespaces one where your 0 is > mapped to your uid and a second where your uid is identity mapped is > the > preferrable configuration, and makes this patch unnecessary. I don't really understand this. My usecase is that I want a desktop app sandbox, it should run as the actual user that is running the graphical session mapped to its real uid. In this namespace i want a /dev/pts so that i can e.g. shell out to ssh and feed it a password on the tty prompt or similar. And i don't want to bind-mount in the host /dev/pts, because then the sandbox can read from the ttys of other apps. Where does the second namespace enter into this? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
