Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 5:46 AM, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 05/15/2015 05:05 PM, Paul Moore wrote: >>> On Thursday, May 14, 2015 11:23:09 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>> On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 7:32 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On 15/05/14, Paul Moore wrote: >>>>>> * Look at our existing audit records to determine which records should >>>>>> have >>>>>> namespace and container ID tokens added. We may only want to add the >>>>>> additional fields in the case where the namespace/container ID tokens are >>>>>> not the init namespace. >>>>> If we have a record that ties a set of namespace IDs with a container >>>>> ID, then I expect we only need to list the containerID along with auid >>>>> and sessionID. >>>> The problem here is that the kernel has no concept of a "container", and I >>>> don't think it makes any sense to add one just for audit. "Container" is a >>>> marketing term used by some userspace tools. >>>> >>>> I can imagine that both audit could benefit from a concept of a >>>> namespace *path* that understands nesting (e.g. root/2/5/1 or >>>> something along those lines). Mapping these to "containers" belongs >>>> in userspace, I think. >>> It might be helpful to climb up a few levels in this thread ... >>> >>> I think we all agree that containers are not a kernel construct. I further >>> believe that the kernel has no business generating container IDs, those should >>> come from userspace and will likely be different depending on how you define >>> "container". However, what is less clear to me at this point is how the >>> kernel should handle the setting, reporting, and general management of this >>> container ID token. >>> >> Wouldn't the easiest thing be to just treat add a containerid to the >> process context like auid. > > I believe so. At least that was the point I was trying to get across > when I first jumped into this thread. It sounds nice but containers are not just a per process construct. Sometimes you might know anamespace but not which process instigated action to happen on that namespace. >> Then make it a privileged operation to set it. Then tools that care about >> auditing like docker can set the ID >> and remove the Capability from it sub processes if it cares. All >> processes adopt parent processes containerid. >> Now containers can be audited and as long as userspace is written >> correctly nested containers can either override the containerid or not >> depending on what the audit rules are. > > This part I'm still less certain on. I agree that setting the > container ID should be privileged in some sense, but the kernel > shouldn't *require* privilege to create a new container (however the > user chooses to define it). Simply requiring privilege to set the > container ID and failing silently may be sufficient. My hope is as things mature fewer and fewer container things will need any special privilege to create. I think it needs to start with a clear definition of what is wanted and then working backwards through which messages in which contexts you want to have your magic bits. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
