The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file for the task
that caused the copy-up. This helps prevent overlayfs from being used to
access something it shouldn't.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f43f07fdc028..57f9c641779f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3144,7 +3144,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
{
- return 0;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, src, FILE__OPEN | FILE__READ);
}
static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
--
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