On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 2:24 PM, Seth Forshee
<seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
> allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
> for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
> cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns
> to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user
> the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable
> to manipulate. Therefore access with allow_other should be
> restricted to users in the userns as the superblock or a
> descendant of that namespace.
Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Serge H. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/fuse/dir.c | 10 ++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> index 123db1e06c78..b23ec5c1ff18 100644
> --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> @@ -1091,8 +1091,14 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
> {
> const struct cred *cred;
>
> - if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
> - return 1;
> + if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER) {
> + struct user_namespace *ns;
> + for (ns = current_user_ns(); ns; ns = ns->parent) {
> + if (ns == fc->user_ns)
> + return 1;
> + }
> + return 0;
> + }
>
> cred = current_cred();
> if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
> --
> 1.9.1
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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