On Tue, Oct 07, 2014 at 12:27:06PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> Andrew Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > #define _GNU_SOURCE
> > #include <sys/types.h>
> > #include <sys/stat.h>
> > #include <fcntl.h>
> > #include <sched.h>
> > #include <unistd.h>
> > #include <sys/mount.h>
> >
> > int main(int argc, char **argv)
> > {
> > int fd;
> >
> > fd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY);
> > if (fd < 0)
> > return 1;
> > while (1) {
> > if (umount2("/", MNT_DETACH) ||
> > setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS))
> > break;
> > }
> >
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# gcc -Wall nsenter.c -o nsenter
> > root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# strace ./nsenter
> > execve("./nsenter", ["./nsenter"], [/* 22 vars */]) = 0
> > ...
> > open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY) = 3
> > umount("/", MNT_DETACH) = 0
> > setns(3, 131072) = 0
> > umount("/", MNT_DETACH
> >
> causes:
>
> > [ 260.548301] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > [ 260.550941] kernel BUG at /build/buildd/linux-3.13.0/fs/pnode.c:372!
> > [ 260.552068] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
> > [ 260.552068] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_tcpudp xt_addrtype xt_conntrack ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack bridge stp llc dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_bio_prison iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel binfmt_misc nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl aesni_intel nfs lockd aes_x86_64 sunrpc fscache lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw ppdev parport_pc lp parport btrfs xor raid6_pq libcrc32c psmouse floppy
> > [ 260.552068] CPU: 0 PID: 1723 Comm: nsenter Not tainted 3.13.0-30-generic #55-Ubuntu
> > [ 260.552068] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> > [ 260.552068] task: ffff8800376097f0 ti: ffff880074824000 task.ti: ffff880074824000
> > [ 260.552068] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811e9483>] [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> > [ 260.552068] RSP: 0018:ffff880074825e98 EFLAGS: 00010246
> > [ 260.552068] RAX: ffff88007c741140 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff88007c741190
> > [ 260.552068] RDX: ffff88007c741190 RSI: ffff880074825ec0 RDI: ffff880074825ec0
> > [ 260.552068] RBP: ffff880074825eb0 R08: 00000000000172e0 R09: ffff88007fc172e0
> > [ 260.552068] R10: ffffffff811cc642 R11: ffffea0001d59000 R12: ffff88007c741140
> > [ 260.552068] R13: ffff88007c741140 R14: ffff88007c741140 R15: 0000000000000000
> > [ 260.552068] FS: 00007fd5c7e41740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > [ 260.552068] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > [ 260.552068] CR2: 00007fd5c7968050 CR3: 0000000070124000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
> > [ 260.552068] Stack:
> > [ 260.552068] 0000000000000002 0000000000000002 ffff88007c631000 ffff880074825ed8
> > [ 260.552068] ffffffff811dcfac ffff88007c741140 0000000000000002 ffff88007c741160
> > [ 260.552068] ffff880074825f38 ffffffff811dd12b ffffffff811cc642 0000000075640000
> > [ 260.552068] Call Trace:
> > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dcfac>] umount_tree+0x20c/0x260
> > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd12b>] do_umount+0x12b/0x300
> > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc642>] ? final_putname+0x22/0x50
> > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc849>] ? putname+0x29/0x40
> > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd88c>] SyS_umount+0xdc/0x100
> > [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff8172aeff>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
> > [ 260.552068] Code: 89 50 08 48 8b 50 08 48 89 02 49 89 45 08 e9 72 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 e6 4c 89 e7 e8 f5 f6 ff ff 48 89 c3 e9 39 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 b8 01
> > [ 260.552068] RIP [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> > [ 260.552068] RSP <ffff880074825e98>
> > [ 260.611451] ---[ end trace 11c33d85f1d4c652 ]--
>
> Which in practice is totally uninteresting. Only the global root user can
> do it, and it is just a stupid thing to do.
>
> However that is no excuse to allow a silly way to oops the kernel.
>
> We can avoid this silly problem by setting MNT_LOCKED on the rootfs
> mount point and thus avoid needing any special cases in the unmount
> code.
I had this idea too, but it doesn't work.
MNT_LOCKED isn't inherited, if the privileged user creates a new mount
namespace.
So "unshame -m ./nsenter" reproduces the same BUG.
Thanks,
Andrey
>
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 7c5834381a73..9c6ee037bef7 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -2887,6 +2887,7 @@ static void __init init_mount_tree(void)
>
> root.mnt = mnt;
> root.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
> + mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
>
> set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &root);
> set_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
> --
> 1.9.1
>
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