Quoting Seth Forshee (seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
> in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
> could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
> mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
> when this would not have otherwise been permitted. Prevent this
> by adding a check that the uid is valid before the comparison.
>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
I'm a bit uncomfortable about this, but I can't put my finger
on why. Wonder if it could mess up root looking into
a malicious user's task by looking under /proc/self/root.
I suppose not, as this should only be the case (with root in
init_user_ns) for fuse?
Anyway it seems needed for keeping root from falling into a trap.
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/namei.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index a996bb48dfab..193da09e903e 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
> return 0;
>
> /* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
> - if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
> + if (uid_valid(inode->i_uid) && uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
> return 0;
>
> audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", link);
> --
> 1.9.1
>
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