Hi Hugh
Thanks for the review! Looks all good, few comments inline in case I
didn't agree. Everything else I didn't comment on is fixed in my tree.
On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 4:16 AM, Hugh Dickins <hughd@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, 15 Apr 2014, David Herrmann wrote:
>> diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
>> index 4d1771c..c043d67 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
>> @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
>> #ifndef __SHMEM_FS_H
>> #define __SHMEM_FS_H
>>
>> +#include <linux/file.h>
>> #include <linux/swap.h>
>> #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
>> #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>> @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info {
>> struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */
>> struct list_head swaplist; /* chain of maybes on swap */
>> struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */
>> + u32 seals; /* shmem seals */
>
> Okay. I do wonder why you chose "u32" where I would have chosen
> "unsigned int": probably just our different backgrounds - kernel
> internals most often use the basic types, whereas you are thinking
> about explicit interfaces. Even syscalls tend to have "int" args,
> but perhaps that's just a historic mistake. I have no good reason
> to disagree with your use of "u32", but draw attention to it in
> case someone else feels more strongly.
>
> Oh, how about you move "seals" up between "lock" and "flags":
> on many configurations, it will then occupy what used to be padding.
No specific reason for u32, just personal preference. I've changed it
to "unsigned int" and moved it up.
>> struct inode vfs_inode;
>> };
>>
>> @@ -65,4 +67,22 @@ static inline struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page(
>> mapping_gfp_mask(mapping));
>> }
>>
>> +/* marks inode to support sealing */
>> +#define SHMEM_ALLOW_SEALING (1U << 31)
>
> This feels unnecessary to me: see comment on shmem_add_seals.
Indeed, we can just mark all files as "already sealed" except for
memfd-files. This causes SHMEM_GET_SEALS to succeed on non-memfd
files, but i think that's fine. Fixed!
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM
>
> Should that rather be CONFIG_TMPFS? I think you have placed
> shmem_fcntl() and its supporting functions in the CONFIG_TMPFS
> part of mm/shmem.c (and CONFIG_TMPFS depends on CONFIG_SHMEM).
>
> It's almost certainly true that "CONFIG_TMPFS" has outlived its v2.4
> usefulness, and serves as more of a confusion than a help nowadays:
> particularly since !CONFIG_SHMEM gives you the ramfs filesystem, but
> CONFIG_SHMEM without CONFIG_TMPFS does not give you a filesystem.
>
> Blame me for leaving CONFIG_TMPFS around; but for now,
> I think it's CONFIG_TMPFS you want there (please check).
We definitely want TMPFS for ftruncate/fallocate and friends. Fixed!
>> +
>> +extern int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, u32 seals);
>> +extern int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file);
>> +extern long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
>> +
>> +#else
>> +
>
> Are you sure you want to generate a link error rather than a runtime
> fallback if there's a driver using shmem_add_seals() or shmem_get_seals()
> in a !CONFIG_SHMEM kernel? That might be the right decision, but it
> surprises me a little.
I have some experimental kernel patches that depend on sealing. As
there is currently no way to test for sealing via Kconfig, I thought a
link-error is the best solution. I expect people to change this once
we actually have code that can deal with a fallback. But I couldn't
come up with a use-case were people want sealing as an optional
feature.
>> +static inline long shmem_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned long a)
>> +{
>> + return -EINVAL;
>
> Should be -EBADF to match what you get in the CONFIG_SHMEM case.
>
>> +}
>> +
>> +#endif
>> +
>> #endif
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
>> index 074b886..1b9b9f4 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
>> @@ -28,6 +28,21 @@
>> #define F_GETPIPE_SZ (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 8)
>>
>> /*
>> + * Set/Get seals
>> + */
>> +#define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
>> +#define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Types of seals
>> + */
>> +#define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */
>> +#define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */
>> +#define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */
>> +#define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
>> +/* (1U << 31) is reserved for internal use */
>
> I question the need to reserve that: see comment on shmem_add_seals.
>
>> +
>> +/*
>> * Types of directory notifications that may be requested.
>> */
>> #define DN_ACCESS 0x00000001 /* File accessed */
>> diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
>> index 9f70e02..175a5b8 100644
>> --- a/mm/shmem.c
>> +++ b/mm/shmem.c
>> @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
>> #include <linux/highmem.h>
>> #include <linux/seq_file.h>
>> #include <linux/magic.h>
>> +#include <linux/fcntl.h>
>>
>> #include <asm/uaccess.h>
>> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
>> @@ -531,16 +532,23 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_truncate_range);
>> static int shmem_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>> {
>> struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
>> + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>> + loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size;
>> + loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;
>> int error;
>>
>> error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
>> if (error)
>> return error;
>>
>> - if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
>> - loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size;
>> - loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;
>> + /* protected by i_mutex */
>> + if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
>> + if ((newsize < oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)) ||
>> + (newsize > oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW)))
>> + return -EPERM;
>> + }
>>
>> + if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
>> if (newsize != oldsize) {
>> i_size_write(inode, newsize);
>> inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
>> @@ -1289,6 +1297,13 @@ out_nomem:
>>
>> static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>> {
>> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>> + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>> +
>> + /* protected by mmap_sem */
>> + if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
>> + return -EPERM;
>> +
>> file_accessed(file);
>> vma->vm_ops = &shmem_vm_ops;
>> return 0;
>> @@ -1373,7 +1388,15 @@ shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
>> struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
>> {
>> struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
>> + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>> pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
>> +
>> + /* i_mutex is held by caller */
>> + if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
>> + return -EPERM;
>> + if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && pos + len > inode->i_size)
>> + return -EPERM;
>> +
>> return shmem_getpage(inode, index, pagep, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
>> }
>>
>> @@ -1719,11 +1742,133 @@ static loff_t shmem_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
>> return offset;
>> }
>>
>> +#define F_ALL_SEALS (F_SEAL_SEAL | \
>> + F_SEAL_SHRINK | \
>> + F_SEAL_GROW | \
>> + F_SEAL_WRITE)
>> +
>> +int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, u32 seals)
>> +{
>> + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
>> + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
>> + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>> + int r;
>
> mm/shmem.c is currently using "int error", "int err", "int ret" or
> "int retval" for this (maybe more!): I'd prefer you not to add "r"
> to the menagerie, "error" or "err" would be good here.
>
>> +
>> + /* SHMEM_ALLOW_SEALING is a private, unused bit */
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(F_ALL_SEALS & SHMEM_ALLOW_SEALING);
>
> I see no need for SHMEM_ALLOW_SEALING.
> Now that you have added F_SEAL_SEAL, why don't you just make
> shmem_get_inode() initialize info->seals with F_SEAL_SEAL,
> then clear that in the one place you need to in the next patch?
>
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * SEALING
>> + * Sealing allows multiple parties to share a shmem-file but restrict
>> + * access to a specific subset of file operations. Seals can only be
>> + * added, but never removed. This way, mutually untrusted parties can
>> + * share common memory regions with a well-defined policy. A malicious
>> + * peer can thus never perform unwanted operations on a shared object.
>> + *
>> + * Seals are only supported on special shmem-files and always affect
>> + * the whole underlying inode. Once a seal is set, it may prevent some
>> + * kinds of access to the file. Currently, the following seals are
>> + * defined:
>> + * SEAL_SEAL: Prevent further seals from being set on this file
>> + * SEAL_SHRINK: Prevent the file from shrinking
>> + * SEAL_GROW: Prevent the file from growing
>> + * SEAL_WRITE: Prevent write access to the file
>> + *
>> + * As we don't require any trust relationship between two parties, we
>> + * must prevent seals from being removed. Therefore, sealing a file
>> + * only adds a given set of seals to the file, it never touches
>> + * existing seals. Furthermore, the "setting seals"-operation can be
>> + * sealed itself, which basically prevents any further seal from being
>> + * added.
>> + *
>> + * Semantics of sealing are only defined on volatile files. Only
>> + * anonymous shmem files support sealing. More importantly, seals are
>> + * never written to disk. Therefore, there's no plan to support it on
>> + * other file types.
>> + */
>> +
>> + if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
>> + return -EBADF;
>
> Okay: that's not what I expect -EBADF to mean, but it does follow
> the precedent set by pipe_fcntl().
I wasn't sure about that either, but as you noticed this behavior is
copied from pipe_fcntl(). I'm open for discussion, but if no-one cares
I will keep this behavior.
>> + if (!(info->seals & SHMEM_ALLOW_SEALING))
>> + return -EBADF;
>> + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>> + return -EPERM;
>> + if (seals & ~(u32)F_ALL_SEALS)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * - i_mutex prevents racing write/ftruncate/fallocate/..
>> + * - mmap_sem prevents racing mmap() calls
>> + */
>> +
>> + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
>> + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
>
> I don't think that use of current->mm->mmap_sem can be correct:
> it guards against races with other threads of this process, but
> what if another process has this object open and races to mmap it?
>
> I imagine you have to use i_mmap_mutex, and plumb an error return
> into __vma_link_file() etc in mm/mmap.c, if the file is found already
> sealed against writing - which may prove irritating, especially with
> knowledge of sealing being private to mm/shmem.c.
Yes, that access to "current->mm" is wrong.
i_mmap_mutex is the only per-object lock that is taken in the mmap()
path and all vma_link() users can easily be changed to deal with
errors. So I think it should be easy to make __vma_link_file() fail if
no writable mappings are allowed. Testing for shmem-seals seems odd
here, indeed. We could instead make i_mmap_writable work like
i_writecount. If it's negative, no new writable mappings are allowed.
shmem_set_seals() could then decrement it to <0 and __vma_link_file()
just tests whether it's negative. Comments?
> But I have not stopped to work it out properly: the answer may depend
> on the answer to the major issue of outstanding async I/O. As I
> mentioned last week, that's an issue I think we cannot overlook.
> Tony's copy-raised-pagecount-pages suggestion is a good one, but
> not so attractive that I'll give up hope for a better solution.
>
>> +
>> + /* you cannot seal while shared mappings exist */
>> + if (file->f_mapping->i_mmap_writable > 0) {
>> + r = -EPERM;
>> + goto unlock;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (info->seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) {
>> + r = -EPERM;
>> + goto unlock;
>> + }
>> +
>> + info->seals |= seals;
>> + r = 0;
>> +
>> +unlock:
>> + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
>> + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
>> + return r;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(shmem_add_seals);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_add_seals).
>
> We don't see an example of its use, but I certainly don't want to see
> drivers/gpu changes as part of this patchset, so I think that's okay.
>
>> +
>> +int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file)
>> +{
>> + struct shmem_inode_info *info;
>> +
>> + if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
>> + return -EBADF;
>> +
>> + info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file));
>> + if (!(info->seals & SHMEM_ALLOW_SEALING))
>> + return -EBADF;
>
> Hmm, so the F_SEAL_SEAL change I suggest would remove that -EBADF,
> and instead return F_SEAL_SEAL on any shmem object. I think that's
> fine, but you may see a reason why not?
Fine with me.
>> +
>> + return info->seals & F_ALL_SEALS;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(shmem_get_seals);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_get_seals).
>
>> +
>> +long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>> +{
>> + long r;
>
> long ret or retval please.
>
>> +
>> + switch (cmd) {
>> + case F_ADD_SEALS:
>> + /* disallow upper 32bit */
>> + if (arg >> 32)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + r = shmem_add_seals(file, arg);
>> + break;
>> + case F_GET_SEALS:
>> + r = shmem_get_seals(file);
>> + break;
>> + default:
>> + r = -EINVAL;
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return r;
>> +}
>> +
>> static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
>> loff_t len)
>> {
>> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>> struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(inode->i_sb);
>> + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>> struct shmem_falloc shmem_falloc;
>> pgoff_t start, index, end;
>> int error;
>> @@ -1735,6 +1880,12 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
>> loff_t unmap_start = round_up(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
>> loff_t unmap_end = round_down(offset + len, PAGE_SIZE) - 1;
>>
>> + /* protected by i_mutex */
>> + if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) {
>> + error = -EPERM;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> if ((u64)unmap_end > (u64)unmap_start)
>> unmap_mapping_range(mapping, unmap_start,
>> 1 + unmap_end - unmap_start, 0);
>> @@ -1749,6 +1900,11 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
>> if (error)
>> goto out;
>>
>> + if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && offset + len > inode->i_size) {
>
> Okay. I don't think it needs a comment, but I note in passing that we
> *could* permit a FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE change there, since it will make
> no difference to what data is accessible; but it would also serve no
> useful purpose, so fine to stick with the simpler test you have.
Yeah, it could be used to fill previously punched holes, but on the
other hand that sounds like a very odd use-case. I will think about
it, but it doesn't hurt to fix it right now.
>> + error = -EPERM;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> start = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
>> end = (offset + len + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
>> /* Try to avoid a swapstorm if len is impossible to satisfy */
>> --
>> 1.9.2
>
> There is also, or may be, a small issue of sparse (holey) files.
> I do have a question on that in comments on your next patch, and
> the answer here may depend on what you want in memfd_create().
>
> What I'm thinking of here is that once a sparse file is sealed
> against writing, we must be sure not to give an error when reading
> its holes: whereas there are a few unlikely ways in which reading
> the holes of a sparse tmpfs file can give -ENOMEM or -ENOSPC.
>
> Most of the memory allocations here can in fact only fail when the
> allocating process has already been selected for OOM-kill: that is
> not guaranteed forever, but it is how __alloc_pages_slowpath()
> currently behaves on ordinary low-order allocations, and will be
> hard to change if we ever do so. Though I dislike relying upon
> this, I think we can allow reading holes to fail, if the process
> is going to be forcibly killed before it returns to userspace.
>
> But there might still be an issue with vm_enough_memory(),
> and there might still be an issue with memcg limits.
>
> We do already use the ZERO_PAGE instead of allocating when it's a
> simple read; and on the face of it, we could extend that to mmap
> once the file is sealed. But I am rather afraid to do so - for
> many years there was an mmap /dev/zero case which did that, but
> it was an easily forgotten case which caught us out at least
> once, so I'm reluctant to reintroduce it now for sealing.
>
> Anyway, I don't expect you to resolve the issue of sealed holes:
> that's very much my territory, to give you support on.
Why not require users to use mlock() if they want to protect
themselves against OOM situations? At least the man-page says that
mlock() guarantess that all pages in the specified range are loaded. I
didn't verify whether that includes holes, though. And if
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is too small, users ought to access the object in
smaller chunks.
And it's not specific to sparse files. Any other page may be swapped
out and the swap-in can fail due to ENOMEM (page-table allocations,
tree-inserts, and so on). But you definitely know better what to do
here, so suggestions welcome.
Anyway, sealing is not meant to protect against OOM situations. I
mean, any mapping is subject to OOM, so processes that care should
have a suitable infrastructure via SIGBUS or mlock() for all mappings,
including sealed files. Furthermore, write-sealing is meant to prevent
targeted attacks that modify data while it is being parsed. We
properly protect users against that. OOM is an orthogonal issue, imho.
Moreover, if we guarantee that sealed files are always present in
memory, we give users a way to circumvent RLIMIT_MEMLOCK (only for
readable mappings, but still..).
Thanks a lot for the review!
David
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