On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 1:32 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 12:14:27PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> >> This is the second time in a week that someone has asked for a way to >> have a struct file (or struct inode or whatever) that can't be reopened >> through /proc/pid/fd. This should be quite easy to implement as a >> separate feature. > > What I suggested on a different thread was to add the following new > file descriptor flags, to join FD_CLOEXEC, which would be maniuplated > using the F_GETFD and F_SETFD fcntl commands: > > FD_NOPROCFS disallow being able to open the inode via /proc/<pid>/fd > > FD_NOPASSFD disallow being able to pass the fd via a unix domain socket > > FD_LOCKFLAGS if this bit is set, disallow any further changes of FD_CLOEXEC, > FD_NOPROCFS, FD_NOPASSFD, and FD_LOCKFLAGS flags. > > Regardless of what else we might need to meet the use case for the > proposed File Sealing API, I think this is a useful feature that could > be used in many other contexts besides just the proposed > memfd_create() use case. It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is read-only. That may be enough for the file sealing thing. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html