On 08/14/2013 12:42:19 PM, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
There's a simple and effective way to prevent unlink(2) and rename(2) from operating on any file or directory by simply mounting something on it. In any mount instance in any namespace. Was this considered in the unprivileged mount design? The solution is also theoretically simple: mounts in unpriv namespaces are marked "volatile" and are dissolved on an unlink type operation. Such volatile mounts would be useful in general too.
Would that "anonymous inode" thing that wandered by recently help, letting umount move the mount to one side so you could keep the mount point as the root of your per-process hierarchy but not have it glued to other people's namespaces?
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