From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> In auth unix there are a couple of places INVALID_GID is used a sentinel to mark the end of uc_gids array. Use gid_valid as a type safe way to verify we have not hit the end of valid data in the array. Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> --- net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c | 5 ++--- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c index 55b6ca6..c434fde 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ unx_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *rcred, int flags) for (i = 0; i < groups ; i++) if (!gid_eq(cred->uc_gids[i], GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i))) return 0; - if (groups < NFS_NGROUPS && - cred->uc_gids[groups] != INVALID_GID) + if (groups < NFS_NGROUPS && gid_valid(cred->uc_gids[groups])) return 0; return 1; } @@ -161,7 +160,7 @@ unx_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p) *p++ = htonl((u32) cred->uc_uid); *p++ = htonl((u32) cred->uc_gid); hold = p++; - for (i = 0; i < 16 && cred->uc_gids[i] != INVALID_GID; i++) + for (i = 0; i < 16 && gid_valid(cred->uc_gids[i]); i++) *p++ = htonl((u32) cred->uc_gids[i]); *hold = htonl(p - hold - 1); /* gid array length */ *base = htonl((p - base - 1) << 2); /* cred length */ -- 1.7.5.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
