On Sun, Apr 1, 2012 at 21:19, Kyle Moffett <kyle@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Well, I imagine one typical usecase for closing all FDs is for > security isolation purposes (EG: chroot()+etc), chroot and security in the same sentence...? > and in a great deal of > chroot environments you don't have /proc available. In particular > /proc has been a source of a lot of privilege escalations in the past, > so avoiding mounting it in a chroot is good security policy if > possible. The problem is that the kernel exports quite a bit of information only through the /proc and /sys filesystems. I might try to finish my comprehensive list of functionality depending on /proc sometime soon. The list is quite long. Not mounting /proc is inconvenient at best, it renders the environment unusable quite often and in some cases is outright insecure.. I don't think you can use not mounting /proc as an argument. And, as Peter said, the loop over the directory content is quite efficient. If you want to avoid /proc I suggest you first work on removing the dependencies. Of just secure /proc itself. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
