On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 8:23 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 01/15, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> >> Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs, >> then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot. >> >> ... >> >> + if (!(current->no_new_privs && !is_chrooted) && >> + !capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) > > I must have missed something. How no_new_privs can help if fs->users != 1 ? Whoops. That needs fixing. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
