Re: [PATCH] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 9:58 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 6:12 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
>>> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
>>> subverting privileged binaries.
>>>
>>> This patch completely breaks apparmor.  Someone who understands (and
>>> uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> [....]
>>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>>> index c1e18ba..7f480b7 100644
>>> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
>>> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>>> @@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>        if (bprm->cred_prepared)
>>>                return 0;
>>>
>>> +       /* XXX: someone who understands apparmor needs to fix this. */
>>> +       BUG_ON(bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
>>> +
>>>        cxt = bprm->cred->security;
>>>        BUG_ON(!cxt);
>>>
>>
>> Since apparmor_bprm_set_creds() calls cap_bprm_set_creds() already[1],
>> I think AppArmor needs no changes at all, but John will know better.
>> :)
>
> I think that AppArmor determines what a program is allowed to do by
> looking at the path of the executable.  We don't want newly-executed
> programs to gain permissions because they're a different executable
> when we're in no_new_privs mode, so (if I'm right) something different
> needs to happen.

I'll have to go look more closely. I thought cap_bprm_set_creds() was
already evaluating the new privs and blocking any gained privs with
the changes you were making.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html


[Index of Archives]     [Linux Ext4 Filesystem]     [Union Filesystem]     [Filesystem Testing]     [Ceph Users]     [Ecryptfs]     [AutoFS]     [Kernel Newbies]     [Share Photos]     [Security]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite News]     [MIPS Linux]     [ARM Linux]     [Linux Security]     [Linux Cachefs]     [Reiser Filesystem]     [Linux RAID]     [Samba]     [Device Mapper]     [CEPH Development]
  Powered by Linux