[This patch depends on luto@xxxxxxx's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/12/446 ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. This mode enables dynamic enforcement of system call filtering policy in the kernel as specified by a userland task. The policy is expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter program, as is used for userland-exposed socket filtering. Instead of network data, the BPF program is evaluated over struct user_regs_struct at the time of the system call (as retrieved using regviews). A filter program may be installed by a userland task by calling prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER, &fprog); where fprog is of type struct sock_fprog. If the first filter program allows subsequent prctl(2) calls, then additional filter programs may be attached. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. To avoid CONFIG_COMPAT related landmines, once a filter program is installed using specific is_compat_task() and current->personality, it is not allowed to make system calls or attach additional filters which use a different combination of is_compat_task() and current->personality. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time. - Userland already knows its ABI: expected register layout and system call numbers. - Full register information is provided which may be relevant for certain syscalls (fork, rt_sigreturn) or for other userland filtering tactics (checking the PC). - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. This patch includes its own BPF evaluator, but relies on the net/core/filter.c BPF checking code. It is possible to share evaluators, but the performance sensitive nature of the network filtering path makes it an iterative optimization which (I think :) can be tackled separately via separate patchsets. (And at some point sharing BPF JIT code!) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@xxxxxxx,torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxx) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxx) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxx) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@xxxxxxxxxx) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@xxxxxxxxxx) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@xxxxxxxxxx) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and luto@xxxxxxx v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> --- include/linux/prctl.h | 3 + include/linux/seccomp.h | 70 +++++- kernel/Makefile | 1 + kernel/fork.c | 4 + kernel/seccomp.c | 10 +- kernel/seccomp_filter.c | 642 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sys.c | 4 + security/Kconfig | 16 ++ 8 files changed, 746 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/seccomp_filter.c diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h index a3baeb2..81c6081 100644 --- a/include/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/linux/prctl.h @@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ #define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21 #define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22 +/* Set process seccomp filters */ +#define PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER 37 + /* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */ #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23 #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24 diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index cc7a4e9..d73fc35 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -5,9 +5,30 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP #include <linux/thread_info.h> +#include <linux/types.h> #include <asm/seccomp.h> -typedef struct { int mode; } seccomp_t; +/* Valid values of seccomp_struct.mode */ +#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED 0 /* seccomp is not in use. */ +#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 /* uses hard-coded seccomp.c rules. */ +#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* system call access determined by filter. */ + +struct seccomp_filter; +/** + * struct seccomp_struct - the state of a seccomp'ed process + * + * @mode: indicates one of the valid values above for controlled + * system calls available to a process. + * @filter: Metadata for filter if using CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER. + * @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there + * is no guard. + */ +typedef struct seccomp_struct { + int mode; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + struct seccomp_filter *filter; +#endif +} seccomp_t; extern void __secure_computing(int); static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall) @@ -28,8 +49,7 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s) #include <linux/errno.h> -typedef struct { } seccomp_t; - +typedef struct seccomp_struct { } seccomp_t; #define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0) static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void) @@ -49,4 +69,48 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s) #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + + +extern long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *); + +extern struct seccomp_filter *get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *); +extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *); + +extern int seccomp_test_filters(int); +extern void seccomp_filter_log_failure(int); +extern void seccomp_struct_fork(struct seccomp_struct *child, + const struct seccomp_struct *parent); + +static inline void seccomp_struct_init_task(struct seccomp_struct *seccomp) +{ + seccomp->mode = SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED; + seccomp->filter = NULL; +} + +/* No locking is needed here because the task_struct will + * have no parallel consumers. + */ +static inline void seccomp_struct_free_task(struct seccomp_struct *seccomp) +{ + put_seccomp_filter(seccomp->filter); + seccomp->filter = NULL; +} + +#else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ + +#include <linux/errno.h> + +struct seccomp_filter { }; +/* Macros consume the unused dereference by the caller. */ +#define seccomp_struct_init_task(_seccomp) do { } while (0); +#define seccomp_struct_fork(_tsk, _orig) do { } while (0); +#define seccomp_struct_free_task(_seccomp) do { } while (0); + +static inline long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *a2) +{ + return -ENOSYS; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index e898c5b..0584090 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK) += hung_task.o obj-$(CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR) += watchdog.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS) += irq/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP) += seccomp.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) += seccomp_filter.o obj-$(CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST) += rcutorture.o obj-$(CONFIG_TREE_RCU) += rcutree.o obj-$(CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU) += rcutree.o diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index da4a6a1..22f7ec1 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/cgroup.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> @@ -166,6 +167,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk) free_thread_info(tsk->stack); rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk); ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk); + seccomp_struct_free_task(&tsk->seccomp); free_task_struct(tsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task); @@ -1089,6 +1091,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, goto fork_out; ftrace_graph_init_task(p); + seccomp_struct_init_task(&p->seccomp); rt_mutex_init_task(p); @@ -1375,6 +1378,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) threadgroup_fork_read_unlock(current); perf_event_fork(p); + seccomp_struct_fork(&p->seccomp, ¤t->seccomp); return p; bad_fork_free_pid: diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 57d4b13..b87c1bc 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall) int * syscall; switch (mode) { - case 1: + case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: syscall = mode1_syscalls; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT if (is_compat_task()) @@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall) return; } while (*++syscall); break; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: + if (seccomp_test_filters(this_syscall) == 0) + return; + + seccomp_filter_log_failure(this_syscall); + break; +#endif default: BUG(); } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp_filter.c b/kernel/seccomp_filter.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1c3f60 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/seccomp_filter.c @@ -0,0 +1,642 @@ +/* + * linux/kernel/seccomp_filter.c + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxx> + * + * Extends linux/kernel/seccomp.c to allow tasks to install system call + * filters using a Berkeley Packet Filter program which is executed over + * struct user_regs_struct. + */ + +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/rculist.h> +#include <linux/filter.h> +#include <linux/kallsyms.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/pid.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/reciprocal_div.h> +#include <linux/regset.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/user.h> + + +/** + * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs + * + * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime. + * get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance + * outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this + * is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks. + * @parent: pointer to the ancestor which this filter will be composed with. + * @flags: provide information about filter from creation time. + * @personality: personality of the process at filter creation time. + * @insns: the BPF program instructions to evaluate + * @count: the number of instructions in the program. + * + * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached + * to a task_struct (other than @usage). + */ +struct seccomp_filter { + struct kref usage; + struct seccomp_filter *parent; + struct { + uint32_t compat:1, /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ + __reserved:31; + } flags; + int personality; + unsigned short count; /* Instruction count */ + struct sock_filter insns[0]; +}; + +static unsigned int seccomp_run_filter(const u8 *buf, + const size_t buflen, + const struct sock_filter *); + +/** + * seccomp_filter_alloc - allocates a new filter object + * @padding: size of the insns[0] array in bytes + * + * The @padding should be a multiple of + * sizeof(struct sock_filter). + * + * Returns ERR_PTR on error or an allocated object. + */ +static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_filter_alloc(unsigned long padding) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *f; + unsigned long bpf_blocks = padding / sizeof(struct sock_filter); + + /* Drop oversized requests. */ + if (bpf_blocks == 0 || bpf_blocks > BPF_MAXINSNS) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Padding should always be in sock_filter increments. */ + if (padding % sizeof(struct sock_filter)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + f = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) + padding, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!f) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + kref_init(&f->usage); + f->count = bpf_blocks; + return f; +} + +/** + * seccomp_filter_free - frees the allocated filter. + * @filter: NULL or live object to be completely destructed. + */ +static void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter) +{ + if (!filter) + return; + put_seccomp_filter(filter->parent); + kfree(filter); +} + +static void __put_seccomp_filter(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *orig = + container_of(kref, struct seccomp_filter, usage); + seccomp_filter_free(orig); +} + +void seccomp_filter_log_failure(int syscall) +{ + pr_info("%s[%d]: system call %d blocked at 0x%lx\n", + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), syscall, + KSTK_EIP(current)); +} + +/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of @orig and may free. */ +void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig) +{ + if (!orig) + return; + kref_put(&orig->usage, __put_seccomp_filter); +} + +/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of @orig. */ +struct seccomp_filter *get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig) +{ + if (!orig) + return NULL; + kref_get(&orig->usage); + return orig; +} + +static int seccomp_check_personality(struct seccomp_filter *filter) +{ + if (filter->personality != current->personality) + return -EACCES; +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + if (filter->flags.compat != (!!(is_compat_task()))) + return -EACCES; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static const struct user_regset * +find_prstatus(const struct user_regset_view *view) +{ + const struct user_regset *regset; + int n; + + /* Skip 0. */ + for (n = 1; n < view->n; ++n) { + regset = view->regsets + n; + if (regset->core_note_type == NT_PRSTATUS) + return regset; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * seccomp_get_regs - returns a pointer to struct user_regs_struct + * @scratch: preallocated storage of size @available + * @available: pointer to the size of scratch. + * + * Returns NULL if the registers cannot be acquired or copied. + * Returns a populated pointer to @scratch by default. + * Otherwise, returns a pointer to a a u8 array containing the struct + * user_regs_struct appropriate for the task personality. The pointer + * may be to the beginning of @scratch or to an externally managed data + * structure. On success, @available should be updated with the + * valid region size of the returned pointer. + * + * If the architecture overrides the linkage, then the pointer may pointer to + * another location. + */ +__weak u8 *seccomp_get_regs(u8 *scratch, size_t *available) +{ + /* + *regset is usually returned based on task personality, not current + * system call convention. This behavior makes it unsafe to execute + * BPF programs over regviews if is_compat_task or the personality + * have changed since the program was installed. + */ + const struct user_regset_view *view = task_user_regset_view(current); + const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[0]; + size_t scratch_size = *available; + if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRSTATUS) { + /* The architecture should override this method for speed. */ + regset = find_prstatus(view); + if (!regset) + return NULL; + } + *available = regset->n * regset->size; + /* Make sure the scratch space isn't exceeded. */ + if (*available > scratch_size) + *available = scratch_size; + if (regset->get(current, regset, 0, *available, scratch, NULL)) + return NULL; + return scratch; +} + +/** + * seccomp_test_filters - tests 'current' against the given syscall + * @syscall: number of the system call to test + * + * Returns 0 on ok and non-zero on error/failure. + */ +int seccomp_test_filters(int syscall) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *filter; + u8 regs_tmp[sizeof(struct user_regs_struct)], *regs; + size_t regs_size = sizeof(struct user_regs_struct); + int ret = -EACCES; + + filter = current->seccomp.filter; /* uses task ref */ + if (!filter) + goto out; + + /* + * All filters in the list are required to share the same system call + * convention so only the first filter is ever checked. + */ + if (seccomp_check_personality(filter)) + goto out; + + /* + * Grab the user_regs_struct. Normally, regs == ®s_tmp, but + * that is not mandatory. E.g., it may return a point to + * task_pt_regs(current). NULL checking is mandatory. + */ + regs = seccomp_get_regs(regs_tmp, ®s_size); + if (!regs) + goto out; + + /* Only allow a system call if it is allowed in all ancestors. */ + ret = 0; + for ( ; filter != NULL; filter = filter->parent) { + /* Allowed if return value is the size of the data supplied. */ + if (seccomp_run_filter(regs, regs_size, filter->insns) != + regs_size) + ret = -EACCES; + } +out: + return ret; +} + +/** + * seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current. + * @fprog: BPF program to install + * + * Context: User context only. This function may sleep on allocation and + * operates on current. current must be attempting a system call + * when this is called (usually prctl). + * + * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters. + * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) + * for each system call the thread makes. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure. + */ +long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *filter = NULL; + /* Note, len is a short so overflow should be impossible. */ + unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter); + long ret = -EPERM; + + /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ + filter = seccomp_filter_alloc(fp_size); + if (IS_ERR(filter)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(filter); + goto out; + } + + /* Lock the process personality and calling convention. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + if (is_compat_task()) + filter->flags.compat = 1; +#endif + filter->personality = current->personality; + + /* + * If a process lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace, force + * this process and all descendents to run with no_new_privs. + * A privileged process will need to set this bit independently, + * if desired. + */ + if (security_real_capable_noaudit(current, current_user_ns(), + CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0) + current->no_new_privs = 1; + + /* Copy the instructions from fprog. */ + ret = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(filter->insns, fprog->filter, fp_size)) + goto out; + + /* Check the fprog */ + ret = sk_chk_filter(filter->insns, filter->count); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* + * If there is an existing filter, make it the parent + * and reuse the existing task-based ref. + */ + filter->parent = current->seccomp.filter; + + /* Force all filters to use one system call convention. */ + ret = -EINVAL; + if (filter->parent) { + if (filter->parent->flags.compat != filter->flags.compat) + goto out; + if (filter->parent->personality != filter->personality) + goto out; + } + + /* + * Double claim the new filter so we can release it below simplifying + * the error paths earlier. + */ + ret = 0; + get_seccomp_filter(filter); + current->seccomp.filter = filter; + /* Engage seccomp if it wasn't. This doesn't use PR_SET_SECCOMP. */ + if (current->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) { + current->seccomp.mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER; + set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP); + } + +out: + put_seccomp_filter(filter); /* for get or task, on err */ + return ret; +} + +long prctl_attach_seccomp_filter(char __user *user_filter) +{ + struct sock_fprog fprog; + long ret = -EINVAL; + + ret = -EFAULT; + if (!user_filter) + goto out; + + if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog))) + goto out; + + ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog); +out: + return ret; +} + +/** + * seccomp_struct_fork: manages inheritance on fork + * @child: forkee's seccomp_struct + * @parent: forker's seccomp_struct + * + * Ensures that @child inherits seccomp mode and state iff + * seccomp filtering is in use. + */ +void seccomp_struct_fork(struct seccomp_struct *child, + const struct seccomp_struct *parent) +{ + child->mode = parent->mode; + if (parent->mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) + return; + child->filter = get_seccomp_filter(parent->filter); +} + +/** + * load_pointer: checks and returns a pointer to the requested offset + * @buf: u8 array to index into + * @buflen: length of the @buf array + * @offset: offset to return data from + * @size: size of the data to retrieve at offset + * @unused: placeholder which net/core/filter.c uses for for temporary + * storage. Ideally, the two code paths can be merged. + * + * Returns a pointer to the BPF evaluator after checking the offset and size + * boundaries. + */ +static const void *load_pointer(const u8 *buf, size_t buflen, + int offset, size_t size, + void *unused) +{ + if (offset >= buflen) + goto fail; + if (offset < 0) + goto fail; + if (size > buflen - offset) + goto fail; + return buf + offset; +fail: + return NULL; +} + +/** + * seccomp_run_filter - evaluate BPF (over user_regs_struct) + * @buf: buffer to execute the filter over + * @buflen: length of the buffer + * @fentry: filter to apply + * + * Decode and apply filter instructions to the buffer. + * Return length to keep, 0 for none. @buf is a regset we are + * filtering, @filter is the array of filter instructions. + * Because all jumps are guaranteed to be before last instruction, + * and last instruction guaranteed to be a RET, we dont need to check + * flen. + * + * See core/net/filter.c as this is nearly an exact copy. + * At some point, it would be nice to merge them to take advantage of + * optimizations (like JIT). + * + * A successful filter must return the full length of the data. Anything less + * will currently result in a seccomp failure. In the future, it may be + * possible to use that for hard filtering registers on the fly so it is + * ideal for consumers to return 0 on intended failure. + */ +static unsigned int seccomp_run_filter(const u8 *buf, + const size_t buflen, + const struct sock_filter *fentry) +{ + const void *ptr; + u32 A = 0; /* Accumulator */ + u32 X = 0; /* Index Register */ + u32 mem[BPF_MEMWORDS]; /* Scratch Memory Store */ + u32 tmp; + int k; + + /* + * Process array of filter instructions. + */ + for (;; fentry++) { +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) +#define K (fentry->k) +#else + const u32 K = fentry->k; +#endif + + switch (fentry->code) { + case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X: + A += X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K: + A += K; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X: + A -= X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K: + A -= K; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X: + A *= X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K: + A *= K; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X: + if (X == 0) + return 0; + A /= X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K: + A = reciprocal_divide(A, K); + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X: + A &= X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K: + A &= K; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X: + A |= X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K: + A |= K; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X: + A <<= X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K: + A <<= K; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X: + A >>= X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K: + A >>= K; + continue; + case BPF_S_ALU_NEG: + A = -A; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JA: + fentry += K; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K: + fentry += (A > K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K: + fentry += (A >= K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K: + fentry += (A == K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K: + fentry += (A & K) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X: + fentry += (A > X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X: + fentry += (A >= X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X: + fentry += (A == X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X: + fentry += (A & X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + continue; + case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS: + k = K; +load_w: + ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, k, 4, &tmp); + if (ptr != NULL) { + /* + * Note, unlike on network data, values are not + * byte swapped. + */ + A = *(const u32 *)ptr; + continue; + } + return 0; + case BPF_S_LD_H_ABS: + k = K; +load_h: + ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, k, 2, &tmp); + if (ptr != NULL) { + A = *(const u16 *)ptr; + continue; + } + return 0; + case BPF_S_LD_B_ABS: + k = K; +load_b: + ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, k, 1, &tmp); + if (ptr != NULL) { + A = *(const u8 *)ptr; + continue; + } + return 0; + case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN: + A = buflen; + continue; + case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN: + X = buflen; + continue; + case BPF_S_LD_W_IND: + k = X + K; + goto load_w; + case BPF_S_LD_H_IND: + k = X + K; + goto load_h; + case BPF_S_LD_B_IND: + k = X + K; + goto load_b; + case BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH: + ptr = load_pointer(buf, buflen, K, 1, &tmp); + if (ptr != NULL) { + X = (*(u8 *)ptr & 0xf) << 2; + continue; + } + return 0; + case BPF_S_LD_IMM: + A = K; + continue; + case BPF_S_LDX_IMM: + X = K; + continue; + case BPF_S_LD_MEM: + A = mem[K]; + continue; + case BPF_S_LDX_MEM: + X = mem[K]; + continue; + case BPF_S_MISC_TAX: + X = A; + continue; + case BPF_S_MISC_TXA: + A = X; + continue; + case BPF_S_RET_K: + return K; + case BPF_S_RET_A: + return A; + case BPF_S_ST: + mem[K] = A; + continue; + case BPF_S_STX: + mem[K] = X; + continue; + case BPF_S_ANC_PROTOCOL: + case BPF_S_ANC_PKTTYPE: + case BPF_S_ANC_IFINDEX: + case BPF_S_ANC_MARK: + case BPF_S_ANC_QUEUE: + case BPF_S_ANC_HATYPE: + case BPF_S_ANC_RXHASH: + case BPF_S_ANC_CPU: + case BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR: + case BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST: + /* ignored */ + continue; + default: + WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "Unknown code:%u jt:%u tf:%u k:%u\n", + fentry->code, fentry->jt, + fentry->jf, fentry->k); + return 0; + } + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 481611f..77f2eda 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1783,6 +1783,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, case PR_SET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2); break; + case PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER: + error = prctl_attach_seccomp_filter((char __user *) + arg2); + break; case PR_GET_TSC: error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 51bd5a0..6491bb1 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -84,6 +84,22 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECCOMP_FILTER + bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering" + select SECCOMP + help + This option provide support for limiting the accessibility of + systems calls at a task-level using a dynamically defined policy. + + System call filtering policy is expressed by the user using + a Berkeley Packet Filter program. The program is attached using + prctl(2). For every system call the task makes, its register + state will be evaluated by the attached filter program. The + result determines if the system call may proceed or if the + task should be terminated. + + See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail. + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS -- 1.7.5.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
