Ted Ts'o <tytso <at> mit.edu> writes: > > On Thu, Sep 29, 2011 at 04:33:52PM +0300, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote: > > >> > > >> There is work currently being done to add checksums for detecting filesystem corruption (see list > archive). However, if the attacker can binary edit the underlying disk device then they can also edit the > checksums (crc32c) at the same time. > > >> > > >> The only secure way to handle this would be a crypto checksum with a secret key. > > > > > > > Can you please give me some links to it???? > > Darrick Wong has been sending patches to the linux-ext4 mailing for > review to use crc32c to protect various parts of the file system > metadata. > > There has been no work to the "crypto checksum with a secret key" bit; > the hard part is where you would securely store the secret key so that > only a trusted kernel has access to it. Sorry I missed this thread. Any reason that trusted/encrypted keys can't be used for storing the secret key? thanks, Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
