Hi! > This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains symlinks > one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is vma->vm_start, the > target is the file. Opening a symlink results in a file that point exactly > to the same inode as them vma's one. Is it good idea security-wise? It looks like symlink but does not behave like one. (And yes, I know we already have similar problems in /proc..) ptrace-may-trace is not good enough protection; I can do this on my own thread to get around read-only protection on fd. (File can be protected from me by directory permissions.) -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
