On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 10:37:58AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> + if (unlikely(inode->i_op->lookup))
> + dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_LOOKUP;
Would simply adding an S_ISDIR check first help the same without adding
another flag?
> + if (unlikely(inode->i_op->permission))
> + dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_PERMISSION;
> + if (unlikely(inode->i_op->follow_link))
> + dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_FOLLOW_LINK;
Now that the follow_link abuse for automoun is gone I wonder if we really
need to keep supporting it on anything but links. If not we could
avoid the additional flag by simply checking of S_ISLNK first.
We can also add new dentry to inode pointers without going through
__d_instanciate in d_obtain_alias, so that case also needs to set your
flags.
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 14ab8d3f2f0c..02b680e0e816 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -577,12 +577,12 @@ static int complete_walk(struct nameidata *nd)
> * short-cut DAC fails, then call ->permission() to do more
> * complete permission check.
> */
> -static inline int exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> +static inline int exec_permission(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> int ret;
> struct user_namespace *ns = inode_userns(inode);
>
> - if (inode->i_op->permission) {
> + if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_PERMISSION) {
> ret = inode->i_op->permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags);
> } else {
The permission bits clash with Al changes in that area, including the
removal of exec_permission and the ->permission prototype change.
I think you should rebase ontop of his for-next tree.
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