Nick Piggin <npiggin@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On Tue, Jan 18, 2011 at 6:07 AM, Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Nick Piggin <npiggin@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 15, 2011 at 1:52 AM, Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> Nick Piggin <npiggin@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> While hunting down a bug in NFS's AIO, I believe I found this
>>>>> buggy code...
>>>>>
>>>>> fs: aio fix rcu ioctx lookup
>>>>>
>>>>> aio-dio-invalidate-failure GPFs in aio_put_req from io_submit.
>>>>>
>>>>> lookup_ioctx doesn't implement the rcu lookup pattern properly.
>>>>> rcu_read_lock does not prevent refcount going to zero, so we
>>>>> might take a refcount on a zero count ioctx.
>>>>
>>>> So, does this patch fix the problem? ÂYou didn't actually say....
>>>
>>> No, it seemd to be an NFS AIO problem, although it was a
>>> slightly older kernel so I'll re test after -rc1 if I haven't heard
>>> back about it.
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>> Do you agree with the theoretical problem? I didn't try to
>>> write a racer to break it yet. Inserting a delay before the
>>> get_ioctx might do the trick.
>>
>> I'm not convinced, no. ÂThe last reference to the kioctx is always the
>> process, released in the exit_aio path, or via sys_io_destroy. ÂIn both
>> cases, we cancel all aios, then wait for them all to complete before
>> dropping the final reference to the context.
>
> That wouldn't appear to prevent a concurrent thread from doing an
> io operation that requires ioctx lookup, and taking the last reference
> after the io_cancel thread drops the ref.
io_cancel isn't of any concern here. When io_setup is called, it
creates the ioctx and takes 2 references to it. There are two paths to
destroying the ioctx: one is through process exit, the other is through
a call to sys_io_destroy. The former means that you can't submit more
I/O anyway (which in turn means that there won't be any more lookups on
the ioctx), so I'll focus on the latter.
What you're asking about, then, is a race between lookup_ioctx and
io_destroy. The first thing io_destroy does is to set ctx->dead to 1
and remove the ioctx from the list:
spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
was_dead = ioctx->dead;
ioctx->dead = 1;
hlist_del_rcu(&ioctx->list);
spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
if (likely(!was_dead))
put_ioctx(ioctx); /* twice for the list */
aio_cancel_all(ioctx);
wait_for_all_aios(ioctx);
wake_up(&ioctx->wait);
put_ioctx(ioctx); /* once for the lookup */
The lookup code is this:
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(ctx, n, &mm->ioctx_list, list) {
if (ctx->user_id == ctx_id && !ctx->dead) {
get_ioctx(ctx);
ret = ctx;
break;
...
In order for the race to occur, the lookup code would have to find the
ioctx on the list without the dead mark set. Then, the io_destroy code
would have to do all of its work, including its two put_ioctx calls, and
finally the get_ioctx from the lookup would have to happen.
Possible? Maybe. It certainly isn't explicitly protected against. Go
ahead and re-post the patch. I agree that it's a theoretical race. =)
Cheers,
Jeff
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