> On Tuesday, June 29, 2010 08:16:08 pm KOSAKI Motohiro wrote: > > > For the audit system, we want the real, unsanitized task->comm. We record > > > it in a special format to the audit logs such that unprintable > > > characters are included. We want it exactly this way for certification > > > purposes as well as forensic evidence if someone was playing games. If > > > you do sanitize it for other areas of the kernel, please give us a way > > > to get the unsanitized text. > > > > Probably this mail is offtopic. I think audit is unrelated with this > > discusstion. because when forensic, admins shouldn't believe task->comm > > at all. because 1) no path information, perhaps "ls" might mean > > "/home/attackers-dir/evil-script/ls" 2) easily obscured by > > prctl(PR_SET_NAME). > > No, its on-topic and we want that information unchanged. Why? I think I've described why admins should't see task->comm during forensic. Do you disagree this? or Do you have another viewpoint? Can you help us clarify your point? > > That said, audit have to logged following two point if task name is > > necessary. 1) exec > > 2) prctl(PRT_SET_NAME) > > > > Thought ? > > The audit system is capable of grabbing that information, too. ok. thanks good information :) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
