Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx> writes: > On Tue 2009-11-24 13:59:06, Miklos Szeredi wrote: >> On Tue, 24 Nov 2009, Pavel Machek wrote: >> > I believe that current semantics is ugly enough that 'documenting' it >> > is not enough... and people want to port from other systems, too, not >> > expecting nasty surprises like this... >> >> This hasn't been a problem for the last 12 years, and still we don't >> see script kiddies exploiting this hole and sysadmins hurrying to >> secure their system, even though it has been public for quite a while. >> >> Why? > > Because condition when it hits are quite unusual? So unusual perhaps that this is not a problem? >> The reason might be, that there *is no* violation of security. > > Well, security people disagree with you. Other security people disagree with you. >> See this: the surprise isn't that an inode can be reached from >> multiple paths, that has been possible with hard links for as long as >> unix lived. The suprise is that the inode can be reached through >> proc. So this "hole" that has been opened about 12 years ago in linux >> is quite well known. Only this particular aspect of it isn't well >> known, but that doesn't mean it's not right, does it? > > It does. Bypassing checks on read-only file descriptors is design > misfeature, and users are clearly unaware. (See bugtraq). Being "old" > does not mean it is right. Being "old" does mean that changing it is a regression if any valid application depends on this feature. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
