On Fri, 06 Nov 2009, ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman wrote: > So far no one who believes this to be a security hole has found it > worth their while to look at nd->intent.open in proc_pid_follow_link > and write a patch. A rather disgusting patch that would be. The fact is, checking permissions on follow_link makes little to no sense. Consider truncate(2), for example. Will we add another intent for that? I really hope not. I'm more and more convinced, that the current behavior is the right one. Thanks, Miklos -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
