On Thu, Jul 04, 2024 at 04:03:59PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > On Wed, Jul 03, 2024 at 02:43:14PM GMT, Isaac J. Manjarres wrote: > > From: Manish Varma <varmam@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > We'll often see aborted suspend operations that look like: > > > > PM: suspend entry 2024-07-03 15:55:15.372419634 UTC > > PM: PM: Pending Wakeup Sources: [timerfd] > > Abort: Pending Wakeup Sources: [timerfd] > > PM: suspend exit 2024-07-03 15:55:15.445281857 UTC > > > > From this, it seems a timerfd caused the abort, but that can be > > confusing, as timerfds don't create wakeup sources. However, > > eventpoll can, and when it does, it names them after the underlying > > file descriptor. Unfortunately, all the file descriptors are called > > "[timerfd]", and a system may have many timerfds, so this isn't very > > useful to debug what's going on to cause the suspend to abort. > > > > To improve this, change the way eventpoll wakeup sources are named: > > > > 1) The top-level per-process eventpoll wakeup source is now named > > "epollN:P" (instead of just "eventpoll"), where N is a unique ID token, > > and P is the PID of the creating process. > > > > 2) Individual eventpoll item wakeup sources are now named > > "epollitemN:P.F", where N is a unique ID token, P is PID of the creating > > process, and F is the name of the underlying file descriptor. > > Fyi, that PID is meaningless or even actively misleading in the face of > pid namespaces. And since such wakeups seem to be registered in sysfs > globally they are visible to all containers. That means a container will > now see some timerfd wakeup source with a PID that might just accidently > correspond to a process inside the container. Which in turn also means Thanks for your feedback on this, Christian. With regards to this scenario: would it be useful to use a namespace ID, along with the PID, to uniquely identify the process? If not, do you have a suggestion for this? I understand that the proposed naming scheme has a chance of causing collisions, however, it is still an improvement over the existing naming scheme in terms of being able to attribute wakeups to a particular application. > you're leaking the info about the creating process into the container. > IOW, if PID 1 ends up registering some wakeup source the container gets > to know about it. Is there a general security concern about this? If not, can you please elaborate why this is a problem? Thanks, Isaac
